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THE NEW CONTRACT: WELFARE REFORM, DEVOLUTION,
AND DUE PROCESS
CHRISTINE

N. CIMINI*

INTRODUCTION

In 1996 Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Welfare Reform Act or PRWORA),I

claiming that fundamental and revolutionary changes were necessary
to cure the perceived intractable problems of the welfare system. The
problems identified by Congress included long-term dependency on
welfare benefits, large numbers of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and
the lack of two parent families.2 In order to address these perceived

problems, the Welfare Reform Act was designed to promote job preparation, work and marriage among recipients, and to increase administrative flexibility for states.' Specific provisions designed to achieve
these goals include: a requirement that each recipient be engaged in
a work-related activity within twenty-four months of receipt of assis-

tance,4 a sixty-month lifetime limit on receipt of assistance,5 obliga* Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. I thank the organizers
and participants of the University of Maryland School of Law symposium on Welfare
Reauthorization, particularly Karen Czapanskiy, without whom the conference would not
have been possible, and Cheryl Miller, for commenting on my Article. For helpful comments and suggestions I also thank Diane Burkhardt, Alan Chen, Roberto Corrada, Karen
Czapanskiy, Ronald Griffin, Ruthann Macolini, and Julie Nice. The University of Denver
College of Law provided valuable financial support for the project. Finally, I thank Jessica
West for her continued and unwavering support of my work.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
V 1999)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2)-(4).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 602(a) (1) (A) (ii). States are required to insure that the requisite percentage
of recipients are participating in "work activities," as defined by the statute. Id.
§ 607(a)(1). The statute defines work activities as:
(1) unsubsidized employment;
(2) subsidized private sector employment;
(3) subsidized public sector employment;
(4) work experience (including work associated with the refurbishing of publicly
assisted housing) if sufficient private sector employment is not available;
(5) on-the-job training;
(6) job search and job readiness assistance;
(7) community service programs;
(8) vocational educational training (not to exceed 12 months with respect to any
individual);
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tions to enter into individual responsibility plans with the government

that set forth the conditions for assistance,6 and devolved authority for
the administration of welfare programs to state and local
governments. 7
Much current debate exists regarding whether these goals and
statutory mandates have succeeded in remedying the perceived
problems of the welfare system. Since passage of the Welfare Reform
Act, the number of welfare recipients has dramatically declined.' In
1994, prior to welfare reform, the number of families receiving assistance nationally was 5 million.9 By March 2001, the number dropped
to 2.1 million.' 0 Though some may consider this decline a tremendous success, such proclamations depend upon the definition of suc-

(9) job skills training directly related to employment;
(10) education directly related to employment, in the case of a recipient who has
not received a high school diploma or a certificate of high school equivalency;
(11) satisfactory attendance at secondary school or in a course of study leading to
a certificate of general equivalence, in the case of a recipient who has not completed secondary school or received such a certificate; and
(12) the provision of child care services to an individual who is participating in a
community service program.
Id. § 607(d). States are permitted to further define each category. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF), 64 Fed. Reg. 17720, 17776, 17778 (Apr. 12,
1999).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7) (A). The statute does include a hardship exception that permits a state to exempt a family from the sixty-month lifetime limit. Id. § 608(a) (7) (C).
6. Id. § 608(b) (2) (A).
7. See id. § 603(a) (providing a block grant payment to each state in order for each
state to administer its own welfare program). At the same time the federal government has
devolved authority to the states, it has retained very limited authority to regulate state conduct. See id. § 617 ("No officer or employee of the Federal Government may regulate the
conduct of States under this part or enforce any provision of this part, except to the extent
expressly provided in this part."); see alsoJuLIE A. NICE & LouISE G. TRUBEK, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON POVERRY LAw: THEORY AND PRACrICE 193 (Supp. 1999) (detailing how the

federal statute explicitly limits the Department of Health and Human Services' authority to
regulate state implementation of TANF). According to one scholar:
The principle of devolution... is based on the notion that decisions made closest
to those affected are likely to be the best informed and certainly the most democratically based. It suggests that actions to implement legitimate government
objectives should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively
addressing the problem.
Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv.
423, 430 (1996).
8. Mark Greenberg, Welfare Reform and Devolution, Looking Back and Forward, BROOKINGS REv., Summer 2001, at 20, 22.
9. Id.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES: TOTAL NUMBER OF

families.htm.

FAMILIES (2001),

available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/
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cess. t ' If the ultimate goal is to effectuate a decrease in the number of
welfare recipients, it is difficult to argue with the numbers. However,
if one evaluates welfare reform's success in creating a fair system for
the distribution of government benefits, the analysis is less than
conclusive.
Focusing exclusively on the number of recipients no longer receiving welfare ignores numerous unresolved philosophical, political,
social, and legal questions accompanying this sweeping overhaul of
the welfare system. Congressional reauthorization of the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program in 2002 presents an
opportunity to unearth and explore many of these unresolved issues.
This Article will explore one aspect of the manifold legal implications
of welfare reform-namely, under the new paradigm of public assistance, does the government remain accountable to recipients for its
administration of welfare benefits?
An analysis of the question of government accountability may illuminate one reason for the rapidly decreasing number of welfare recipients. For example, is there a correlation between a decrease in the
number of welfare recipients and the perception that due process
mandates no longer exist under welfare reform? Or, are welfare recipients falling off the roles because of inadequate procedural due
process protections?1 2 If, in fact, governments are presuming that
welfare benefits are no longer an "entitlement" and are, therefore,
sanctioning recipients without adequate notice or process,1 3 scholars

11. See Sanford F. Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy Discourse, and
the Politics of Research, 577 ANNALS 49, 50 (2001) (discussing how some view a decline in the
number of welfare recipients as evidence of its success, and questioning the standards used
to measure such success); see also BILL BERKOWITZ, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, PROSPECTING
AMONG THE POOR: WELFARE PRIVATIZATION 19 (2001) ("While welfare privatization has de-

livered drastic reductions in caseloads and welfare rolls, it has not moved recipients from
the 'underclass' to the working class. Privatization is not efficiently deliveringjob training
and support services to those who need them."); David Kocieniewski, Study Finds Mixed
Results in Reducing Welfare Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at B6 (describing a study which
found that two thirds of the individuals leaving New Jersey's welfare rolls remained below
the federal poverty level, and that half experienced serious housing problems including
eviction, staying in shelters, or moving in with family and friends).
12. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATE SANCTION POLICIES
4-5 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, WELFARE REFORM]. The
report explains that a substantial number of families have been affected by sanctions, increasing the possibility that sanctioning does not comport with minimal standards of due
process: "During an average month in 1998, about 135,800 families received reduced bene-

AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES AFFECTED

fits or no TANF benefits at all as a result of sanctions for failure to comply with TANF work
and other responsibilities." Id. at 5.
13. One recent case involving the procedural due process implications of welfare reform tends to support the idea that at least one state and county are operating as if recipients are no longer entitled to minimum standards of procedural due process. Weston v.
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and advocates should give serious thought to conceiving alternative
bases for due process protections.'

4

This Article identifies contracts,

both social contract and traditional legal contracts, as alternative
means to provide recipients with due process protections.
Passage of the Welfare Reform Act fundamentally shifted the paradigm of public assistance from a federal statutory entitlement model
to a devolved contractual model. Under the previous entitlement
model of administration, recipients obtained due process protections
based upon eligibility criteria that afforded caseworkers little discretion.1 5 Caseworkers applied very specific eligibility rules to each potential applicant to determine whether the individual qualified for
benefits.1 6 Once an applicant qualified for benefits, the applicant was
entitled to receive assistance. Thus, the statutory criteria and absence
of caseworker discretion created a legitimate expectation in the receipt of benefits for qualified applicants.1 7 This legitimate expectation formed the basis of an "entitlement," which was construed by the

Cassata, No. 99CA2449 (Colo. Ct. App.July5, 2001); see also infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text (describing the lack of due process given to welfare recipients). The following excerpt exemplifies the position held by some state and local governments:
[Defendant Adams County]: "It is ... defendant's argument that, in fact, there is
no due process right to notice under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution or under the Colorado Constitution. .... "
The Court: "Are you saying there's no right to notice because there's no right to
due process because there's no property interest?"
[Defendant Adams County]: "Absolutely."
The Court: "Okay. Meaning that under that scenario there's no right to notice at
all? Agreed?"
Defendant Adams County: "Absolutely."
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 48-49, Weston v. Hammons, No. 99CV412
(Colo. Dist. Ct. May 28, 1999) (on file with author).
14. See Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL.
L. REv. 569, 625-641 (2001) (offering alternatives to traditional constitutional litigation on
behalf of welfare recipients in the context of privatized welfare).
15. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that "benefits are a matter
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them" and cannot be discontinued
without affording the recipient due process); Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Recipients [of AFDC] have a constitutionally guaranteed right to have an
administrative due process hearing to review an agency action affecting their benefits."); cf
Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that where discretion to
deny benefits is absent, a recipient has a valid property interest in her continuing eligibility
to receive funds).
16. See, e.g., Evans v. Dep't Soc. Serv., 178 N.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)
(concluding that AFDC claimants were entitled to have their interest in public assistance
"considered in accordance with statutory criteria").
17. Cf Alexander, 750 F.2d at 261 (explaining that "[p]otential recipients had a legitimate expectation of receiving benefits upon satisfying the criteria specified in" the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children).
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Supreme Court as "property" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
As constitutionally protected property, recipients of such benefits
were entitled to procedural due process protections in the administration of public assistance.'" As this Article will illustrate, the devolved
contractual model of the Welfare Reform Act dramatically changed
20
this analysis.
In essence, the new devolved contractual model of welfare administration removes federal statutory criteria and allows each state to design and develop its own welfare program within broad federal
guidelines.2 1 In the absence of federal statutory eligibility criteria, the
new model reformulates the role of the caseworker by permitting
much broader discretion in decision-making. 22 Caseworkers now
serve as government agents who assess each applicant and create an
individualized contract or plan detailing the agreement between the
government and the recipient. 23 The new model also decreases traditional government accountability mechanisms, such as specific rules
to govern eligibility, which formerly helped to insure fairness in administration. 24 Further, some states have instituted second order de18. Goldberg,397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (stating that welfare entitlements are "more like 'property' than a 'gratuity'"); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778
(1964). Professor Reich argues that public assistance, like other forms of government largess, such as licenses, franchises, and jobs, should be treated and protected as property. Id.
Moreover, he argues that "[t] he grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of
government largess should be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures." Id. at
783.
19. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266 (holding that welfare recipients are entitled to due
process before their benefits are terminated).
20. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text (describing the changes in welfare
assistance under the 1996 reforms).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999) (providing that states can use the block
grant from the federal government "in any manner that is reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of this part..."). The stated purposes of the block grant are to:
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives;
(2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting
job preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies; and
(4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
Id. § 601 (a) (1)-(4).
22. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121, 1147-48 (2000) ("One pronounced trend
[in implementing the Welfare Reform Act] is the return to administrative schemes that
emphasize discretionary rather than rule-based decisionmaking.").
23. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing the problems resulting
from the devolution of authority from the federal government to the states).
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volution to counties 25 or privatization of administration, 26 which can
increase discretion and decrease the oversight of welfare administration.2 7 Unless due process safeguards exist, this new model of welfare

administration may engender unequal treatment between recipients
and unfair or inappropriate treatment of individual recipients.2
This shift in the paradigm of public assistance administration was
accompanied by the federal statutory provision expressly denying the
existence of an entitlement. 29 The Welfare Reform Act specifically
states that it "shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance ...

"30

While this "no entitlement" provision alone is

not likely dispositive of the (non)existence of an entitlement, 3' the
combination of the no entitlement provision, the lack of federal statutory criteria,3 2 and increased discretion raises questions about previously secured due process protections. Under the previous federal
statutory entitlement model, the existence of express statutory criteria
created legitimate expectations in recipients that led to the creation
of a property interest. 33 Under the new devolved contractual model,
the absence of such criteria and the increase in discretion raises questions regarding the applicability of "legitimate expectation" analysis.
Given the inverse relationship between discretion and legitimate ex25. ANNA LovEjoY & ELAINE M. RYAN, AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASS'N, DEVOLUTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE LOCAL LEVEL: WELFARE REFORM EFFORTS IN FIVE STATES

1 (1998) (describing various second order devolution models in Maryland, North Carolina,
Ohio, Colorado, and Wisconsin).
26. See id. at 8.
27. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (commenting on the increased discretion resulting from privatization).
28. Karen Houppert, You're Not Entitled!: Welfare "Reform" Is Leading to Government Law-

lessness, NATION, Oct. 25, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 9307325 (concluding that governments
and agencies implementing welfare reform are acting lawlessly in the new devolved model
of welfare administration).

29. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (Supp. V 1999).
30. Id.
31. See Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Benefits in the Era of Devolution, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. AND POL'Y (forthcoming Mar. 2002) (arguing that the "no entitlement" provision is
not determinative in regards to the existence of a legal entitlement). But see Michelle L.
VanWiggeren, Comment, Experimenting with Block Grants and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt to Transform Welfare by Altering Federal-StateRelations and Recipients'DueProcess Rights, 46
EMORY L.J. 1327, 1354-55 (1997) (arguing that the "no entitlement" clause was intended to
eliminate the individual entitlement to cash benefits).
32. For example, under the previous AFDC system all states accepted federal monies
and provided assistance to "all eligible individuals" who met the federal criteria for eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (A) (1994) (amended 1996). The Welfare Reform Act has no
such corollary provision.
33. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) ("Such benefits are a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.").
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pectations"4 and the new welfare paradigm, scholars and advocates
would benefit by exploring bases other than "legitimate expectation"
upon which to ground due process rights.
This Article analyzes the due process implications of the change
in welfare administration from the federal statutory entitlement
model to the devolved contractual model and posits that, despite the
changes, due process protections still exist. These protections arise
from an analysis of contracts as evidenced on at least two levels. The
first level is the macro, or implied, contract, which I will refer to as the
social contract between the government and the populace. The second level is the micro, or express, contract encompassing the terms of
the agreement between the recipient and the government. The Article ultimately concludes that both the macro and micro elements of
the devolved contractual model create a new basis of due process protections for recipients of welfare.
Part I of the Article details the fundamental changes accompanying the shift from federal statutory entitlement model to devolved
contractual model. The ways in which these changes have led to increased discretion and less accountability, and the potential benefits
of a contractual due process analysis in light of these changes, are
explored in Part II.
Within this context, Part III of the Article examines the existence
of a new contractual source of due process protections for recipients
and suggests that two different sources of contract may provide due
process protections to recipients. The Article posits that a social contract between the government and the populace is one source of protection. The existence of this social contract is evidenced in
numerous sources including: political theories that explore the use of
political authority; foundational democratic legal sources, such as the
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution; and
the body of social contract rhetoric that permeates social welfare discourse. Finding support to determine that a social contract between
34. Under the traditional procedural due process analysis, the greater the discretion
afforded the administrators, the less likely the court is to find the existence of legitimate
expectations. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (finding "that a State
creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion"); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (holding that a liberty interest did exist
where the statutory language was mandatory in nature and limited the discretion of the
decision-maker); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 (finding that a procedural due process hearing was required before the termination of welfare benefits); Jones-Booker v. United
States, 16 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59-60 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding that the distinction between an
"entitlement" and a mere "expectancy" necessarily depends upon the amount of discretion
provided the decision-maker).
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the government and the populace does exist, the Article then analyzes
the terms of the social contract and concludes that, in addition to
existing constitutional protections, the social contract insures that, at

a minimum, the government must not act in an arbitrary manner.
The second source of contract arises from the existence of express contracts between the government and each individual recipient. These contracts take the form of Individual Responsibility Plans
(IRPs) or Individual Responsibility Contracts (IRCs), which are created by welfare caseworkers and govern the terms of assistance." The
36
Article posits that these agreements are legally cognizable contracts
between the government and each recipient. As such, these contracts
constitute "property" requiring the application of procedural due process protections pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Refraining the bases of due process protections becomes increasingly important as unfettered government discretion adds to the possibility for arbitrary action. Between 1970 and the 1996 passage of the
Welfare Reform Act, advocates and scholars took for granted the existence of a property interest triggering procedural due process protections. The issues that were then debated involved what type of process
was due.3 7 However, under the new devolved contractual model of
welfare, the very foundations that previously secured due process protections have been altered. Given legislative permission for increased
discretion and heightened possibilities for arbitrary action, the question that needs to be addressed is even more fundamental-namely,
how do we ensure that governments are held accountable while administering public assistance.

35. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (describing the requirements of the individual responsibility
plans).
36. This Article uses the term "legally cognizable contract" to refer to an agreement
that meets all the necessary requirements for the creation of an enforceable contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration. The Article specifically does not employ the term "legally enforceable contract" because enforcing the contract in court necessitates
overcoming additional hurdles including jurisdiction and immunity barriers.
37. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (explaining that the type of
process due is flexible and depends on balancing the individual and governmental interests involved); Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that notice to
welfare recipients whose benefits are being reduced which contains only a "brief statement
of reasons" does not satisfy the due process clause).
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THE WELFARE REFORM ACT'S NEW PARADIGM: FROM FEDERAL
STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT MODEL TO DEVOLVED BLOCK GRANT
CONTRACTUAL MODEL

The 1996 passage of the Welfare Reform Act fundamentally
changed the conceptual framework of public assistance to adults with
dependent children. Prior to 1996, the federal cash assistance program to adults with dependent children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), was recognized as a statutory entitlement
available to "all eligible individuals." 8 The 1996 Welfare Reform Act,
however, expressly rejected the existence of any entitlement to assistance.3 9 Rather, the Welfare Reform Act's program of cash assistance
to adults with dependent children, Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families, adopted a contractual model, under which recipients must
agree to comply with both general and specific obligations placed
upon them by the government in order to receive a monthly assistance grant.4" This new contractual model, which reconfigured the
cash assistance program on both systemic and individual levels, differs
from the old entitlement model in various respects. The differences
include: state or local, rather than federal, administrative implementation;" varying state, as opposed to federal, eligibility criteria for appli-

cants;42 and a block grant funding scheme rather than direct funding
from the federal government.43 All of these changes, and others, coalesced to form the basis of the shift in paradigm from entitlement
model to contractual model.
A.

AFDC as an Entitlement

While many elements of the pre-1996 AFDC program evolved after the program's inception in 1935, several components remained

consistent. Throughout its history, the AFDC program was administered based on a model of cooperative federalism.4 4 Under this
38. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (A) (1994) (amended 1996); see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
317 (1968) (emphasizing the statutory requirement that aid "be furnished .. to all eligible
individuals . . .").
39. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (Supp. V 1999). But see Cimini, supra note 31 (arguing that an
entitlement may still exist despite the "no entitlement" language).
40. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 607, 608, 609 (describing the varying obligations to which
recipients must adhere and the penalties that apply to violation of these obligations).
41. Id. § 601(a).
42. Id. § 604(a).
43. Id. § 6 03(a).
44. See Kingv. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (articulating, for the first time, the term
"cooperative federalism" to describe government programs that are run with concurrent
federal and state oversight).
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model, the federal government provided money to the states which, in
turn, administered the program in accord with federal and state rules
and regulations. 45 As a condition to the receipt of federal funding,
states were obligated to provide assistance to "all eligible applicants" as
determined by criteria including household income, resources, and
family members.46 States were permitted discretion in determining
the amount of the monthly benefit.4 7 Funding was provided to states
on an open-ended basis, increasing when a state's AFDC caseload
increased.48
In 1970, after thorough debate regarding the due process implications of the AFDC statutory scheme, the Supreme Court adopted
the well-known entitlement analysis set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly.4 9 In
this analysis of the federal welfare program, the Court determined
that, under the system of cooperative federalism, federal statutory criteria mandated that benefits be provided to all eligible individuals.5 °
Thus, in the absence of significant discretion, an eligible welfare applicant could legitimately expect to be "entitled" to such benefits.5 1 That
entitlement was legally recognized as property, which implicated the
protections of procedural due process, including notice and hearing
requirements. 5 2 Between the Goldbergdecision in 1970 and passage of
the Welfare Reform Act in 1996, the federal statutory entitlement

45. Id. at 316-17.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (A) (1994) (amended 1996) (stating that all eligible recipients were entitled to receive assistance).
47. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105TH CONG., 1998
GREEN BOOK 398-99 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter 1998 GREEN BOOK]; MARK GREENBERG ET AL., CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION: AN EARLY

GUIDE TO THE ISSUES, at pt. II.A (2000), available at http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/
packa.htm.
48. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 47.
49. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); seeCimini, supra note 31 (describing the evolution of the
procedural due process clause as it applies to public assistance). See generally David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 231 (1998) (discussing the
changing due process rights accompanying welfare reform).
50. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 (stating that "benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them"); see also King, 392 U.S. at 317 (concluding that
the federal welfare program "clearly require[s] participating States to furnish aid to families with children").
51. Cimini, supra note 31.
52. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63; see Charles A. Reich, Proerty Law and the New Economic
Order: A Betrayal of Middle Americans and the Poor, 71 CHL-KENT L. REv. 817, 818-19 (1996)
(describing Goldberg as an "important but tentative step[ I" in providing adequate legal
protection to government entitlements).
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model remained the prevailing conceptual framework for an analysis
of the procedural due process implications of public assistance.5 3
B.

The Welfare Reform Act's ContractualModel

Passage of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996 altered several of the
structural premises underlying the conception of public assistance as a
federal statutory entitlement and replaced them with contract
precepts. First, devolution, coupled with the absence of meaningful
federal oversight, 54 resulted in a shift from a federal system to a devolved state-specific system. 55 Further, even while the federal government devolved authority to create and administer programs to the
states, some states in turn devolved authority to local governments.
Under this devolved model, states or localities, rather than the federal
government, determine which families are eligible for assistance, how
long families are eligible, and how much and what type of assistance
they receive. 56 Second, rather than mandatory federal eligibility criteria, states are permitted to use the block grant in any manner reasona57
bly calculated to accomplish the purpose of the Welfare Reform Act.

Third, the Welfare Reform Act altered the funding mechanism of the
program to provide essentially fixed federal funding, under which
each state receives a yearly block grant amount based upon the state's
prior federal spending under the AFDC program.53
53. For an overview of the various critiques of the entitlement model, see generally Joel
F. Handler, "Constructingthe PoliticalSpectacle": The Interpretationof Entitlements, Legalization,
and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899 (1990).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 617 (Supp. V 1999) ("No officer or employee of the Federal Government may regulate the conduct of States under this part or enforce any provision of this
part, except to the extent expressly provided in this part."); see also MARK GREENBERG &
STEVE SAVNER, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, A DETAILED SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BLOCK GRANT OF H.R. 3734, at 46
(1996) (identifying the limited federal oversight and regulation of state and local governments implementing welfare).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (detailing the requirements states must meet in order to receive
block grant money). A publication of the House Committee on Ways and Means described
the shift from AFDC to TANF as follows:
TANF greatly enlarges State discretion in operating family welfare, and it
ends the entitlement of individual families to aid. Under TANF, States decide
what categories of needy families to help (AFDC law defined eligible classes and
required States to aid families in these classes if their income was below State-set
limits). Under TANF, States decide whether to adopt financial rewards and penalties to induce work and other desired behavior. Also, States set asset limits
(AFDC law imposed an outer limit) and continue to set benefit levels.
1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 47, at 398.
56. Cimini, supra note 31; see also 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1); see also supra note 21 (detailing the purposes of the Act).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1); see also GREENBERG & SAVNER, supra note 54, at 10 (explaining how each state receives a family assistance grant).
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Concomitant with these structural changes, the Welfare Reform
Act instituted a new model of individual assistance based upon the
creation of contracts between the government and welfare recipients.
The concept of contractual obligations in the context of public assistance is not entirely novel. 59 One of the major components of the
1988 amendment to AFDC, known as the Family Support Act, required recipients to complete certain obligations in exchange for assistance." Additionally, waivers, which permitted states to circumvent
federal obligations, 6 were increasingly used to place additional obligations upon recipients in exchange for monthly assistance.62
The intention to change public assistance to a contractual model
in the Welfare Reform Act is both explicit and implicit in the legislative history, the rhetoric surrounding passage of the Act, and the statutory language of the Act. In the legislative hearings leading to passage
of the Welfare Reform Act, numerous legislators articulated their desire to change the existing entitlement model of welfare, under which
recipients were perceived as getting something for nothing.6" Instead,
legislators sought to devise a system that obligated a recipient to engage in affirmative responsibilities in exchange for assistance.6 4 Politi-

59. When the Social Security Act (SSA) was enacted in 1935, academics and politicians
construed social insurance programs as contractual in nature. SeeWilliam H. Simon, Rights
and Redistributionin the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1431, 1451-54 (1986) (detailing how
social security was viewed, when enacted, as a contract between private citizens and the
federal government); Allison Moore, Book Note, "From Opportunity to Entitlement" and Back
Again-Or Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 923, 924 (1996) (reviewing GARETH DAVIES, FROM OPPORTUNITY TO ENTITLEMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION AND DECLINE OF GREAT SOCIETY LIBERALISM

(1996)) (finding contractual analogies in the New Deal social insurance and public works
program).
60. The Family Support Act created JOBS (the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Program), under which any welfare recipient with children over three years old had to work as
a condition of assistance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 681-687 (1994) (repealed 1996). Under the JOBS
legislation, welfare recipients who could not get work in the public or private sector had to
enroll in education or job training as a condition of continued assistance. Id. § 682(c).
61. Waivers enable states to create "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]"
that might otherwise violate a specific provision of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
62. See Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
"Reform," 26 MICH. J. L. REFORM 741, 743-44 (1993) (detailing the ways in which waivers
were used to place additional obligations upon recipients). One example of a waiver used
to create additional conditions for recipients is NewJersey's family cap program, which was
designed to deny additional assistance to unmarried women who had additional children
while on AFDC. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1993) (repealed 1997).
63. See, e.g., Welfare Reform: HearingBefore the Senate FinanceComm., 105th Cong. 5 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) ("[W]e must fundamentally change the conceptual
framework of how we think about welfare. Welfare is not a government giving away money
for nothing.").
64. Id. As Senator Harkin explained:
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cians on both the national and state levels clearly used contractual
rhetoric when discussing welfare reform. Prior to its passage, thenPresident Clinton referred to welfare reform as "a simple compact" in
which the government provides support, job training, and child care
for a limited time while recipients work in exchange for assistance.6 5
On the state level, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani explicitly
stated his intent that welfare reform construct a new "social contract"
66
that emphasized every recipient's obligation to contribute.
In addition to the legislative history and political rhetoric, the
statute itself contains an express rejection of the pre-1996 entitlement
model.6 7 The Welfare Reform Act requires that recipients accept government imposed obligations in order to receive assistance.6" Recipients now have to "do something"-volunteer, go to classes, keep
children in school-in order to receive their monthly assistance.6" If

[Wlelfare [is] a contract between an individual and the government which involves mutual responsibility, that the recipient will contract to do certain things,
and the government will contract to do certain things.
Receipt of AFDC benefits must be conditioned on a signed contract between
the recipient [and the state], which outlines steps that the recipient will take to
become self-sufficient ....
Id.
65. Ruth Marcus & Dan Balz, Clinton Outlines Plan to Break Welfare Cycle, WASH. POST,
June 15, 1994, at Al.
66. SeeJason DeParle, What Welfare-To-Work Really Means, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, § 6,
at 50.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (b) (Supp. V 1999) ("[The Welfare Reform Act] shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance . . ").
68. The Welfare Reform Act requires that each individual be assessed, prior to receipt
of assistance, to determine his or her skills, prior work experience, and employability. Id.
§ 608(b) (1). On the basis of this assessment, the state agency may develop a formal agreement that sets forth the employment goals of the recipient, the obligations of the recipient,
and the services the state will provide to the recipient. Id. § 608(b) (2) (A) (i)-(v). All fifty
states and the District of Columbia require some type of written agreement that is signed
by the recipient. Sixteen states require recipients to sign "employability contracts" only,
which focus exclusively on employment related issues. Eighteen states require "responsibility contracts," which proscribe conduct in matters in addition to employment obligations.
These additional matters include child school attendance, child immunization, cooperation with child support enforcement, parenting training and agreements to achieve selfsufficiency. Seventeen states require recipients to sign both "employability contracts" and
"responsibility contracts." See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, FINDINGS IN BRIEF:
TANF APPLICATIONS, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/applications/appsumm.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter TANF APPLICATIONS].
69. These requirements range from the innocuous, such as job search obligations, to
more punitive requirements, such as child school attendance, drug and alcohol programs,
and agreements to achieve self-sufficiency.

See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT,

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS: OBLIGATIONS,

prcreq/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001)
TRACTS: OBLIGATIONS].

available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/

[hereinafter PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CON-
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the recipient fails to comply, the state may reduce the amount of assistance available by whatever amount the state deems appropriate.7 °
The basis for the contractual obligations imposed upon the recipient is determined from a mandatory application assessment. 7' Based
upon information obtained from the assessment of the applicant, the
Welfare Reform Act permits the state to create an individual responsibility plan (IRP) addressing, inter alia: employment goals; a plan to
move the recipient into private sector employment; obligations on the
individual recipient, including nonwork related obligations such as attendance at parenting classes; the services the state is obligated to provide the recipient; and an optional provision for the requirement of
72
substance abuse counseling.
Because IRPs are authorized but not mandated by the federal
statute, the contractual agreement varies among the states. 7' Thirtythree states require recipients to sign "employability contracts," which
focus exclusively on employment related issues. 74 Thirty-five states require "responsibility contracts," which prescribe conduct in both employment and other matters such as child school attendance, child
immunization, child support enforcement cooperation, parenting
training, and agreements to achieve self-sufficiency. 75 Seventeen
states require recipients to sign both "employability contracts" and
"responsibility contracts. "76 While states may vary in the names for

these documents, all states require that the agreements be in writing
77
and that they be signed by the recipients.

70. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (3); see also GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 12, at apps. 11-III
(detailing each state's sanction policies for noncompliance with TANF work responsibilities and child support enforcement); GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 47, at 8 (describing the
position of some advocates who claim "that the extent of state discretion in sanction policy
has contributed to the numbers of families leaving welfare without work, and to the deepening of poverty for the poorest female-headed families").
71. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1).
72. Id. § 608(b) (2)(A)(i)-(v).
73. For a description of the variances in contractual agreements among the states, see
STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS, available at
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/applications/applicprc.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
74. STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, EMPLOYABILITY PLANS, available at http://
www.spdp.org/tanf/applications/applicep.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
75. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS: OBLIGATIONS, supra note 69.
76. TANF APPLICATIONS, supra note 68.
77. See id. (detailing that all states implementing TANF require recipients to sign some
form of the agreement). This Article uses the terms "contractual agreement," "individual
responsibility plan," and "individual responsibility contract" interchangeably because while
the names may differ the basic substance of the underlying agreement does not. Each
agreement is in writing and details, in some form, the obligations the recipient must meet
in order to receive assistance.
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The fundamental shift away from a federal statutory entitlement
model to one of "mutual obligations," and the resulting changes in
administrative implementation of TANF, raise questions regarding
governmental discretion and due process protections. The next section will examine various reasons for increased discretion and explain
why the Article focuses on contracts as a basis of due process protections for recipients. The remainder of the Article will explore
whether these agreements provide a basis of due process protection to
recipients.
II.

REASONS TO PROPOSE A CONTRACTUAL MODEL AS THE BASIS FOR
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS: FACTORS OF INCREASED DISCRETION

This section explores the ways in which the changes described in
the preceding section have led to increased discretion and decreased
accountability. In light of the government's greatly expanded discretion, this section also analyzes the benefits associated with a due process analysis based upon contracts as opposed to legitimate
expectations entilement analysis.
Scholars have identified a number of factors that lead to increased discretion and have found these factors to exist across the
range of welfare administrative models. The factors include: an increased absence of actual rules to guide discretion, a change in the
role of the welfare administrator from eligibility technician to contract
negotiator, devolution of authority to state and local governments,
and the privatization of previously public services.
Actual implementation of the Welfare Reform Act has led to an
increased absence of rules.7 8 In the administration of welfare programs, caseworkers now rely on guidelines that offer a range of options, as opposed to bright-line rules.7 9 In contrast to the previous
rule-based mandates, this new model emphasizes discretionary decision-making s o As a result, caseworker decisions are not legally construed as mere eligibility determinations, but rather as the
78. See Diller, supra note 22, at 1127 (describing the previous welfare system as one that
was principally legal in nature, but arguing that the current system is now "becoming delegalized, shorn of the rules and procedures that characterize a system of laws").
79. See id. at 1196 ("[R]ecipients are promised little that is concrete and specific, and
workers are given a range of actions and leeway to select a course. If the key decisions are
not contained in rules of general applicability, the notice and comment requirements do
not provide an effective avenue for public input.").
80. See id. at 1147-63 (detailing several elements of this trend, including programs
adopting substantive measures that call for discretionary decisions, the increased potency
of sanctions, and the increasing and varying roles played by the caseworkers administering
welfare).
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discretionary application of broad guidelines. As such, this new
model potentially allows caseworker decisions to escape administrative
and judicial review."'
Compounding the problems associated with the absence of rules,
welfare workers are required to play a significantly increased role in
the analysis of an applicant's need without any relevant professional
training. 2 As compared to caseworkers under the AFDC system, who
were mainly eligibility technicians, 3 caseworkers are now asked to be
vocational experts, child care specialists, and even mental health
workers in order to assess and arbitrate the terms of an applicant's
public benefits.8 4 The new contractual scheme transforms the
caseworker into the government's sole bargaining representative with
almost unbridled discretion to dictate contract terms to a welfare re81. Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy
in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1559, 1564
(2001).
82. See Diller, supra note 22, at 1161-63 (describing a current trend "toward recombining administrative functions so that each worker has several roles"). Though caseworkers
operating before the 1960s had a significant amount of discretion, efforts were made after
1960 to create a more rule-based system to ameliorate the perceived abuses that accompanied broad caseworker discretion. Id. at 1140-41. Then, after the extremely influential
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, and after AFDC was legally recognized as an entitlement, the
administrative system became a bureaucratic rule-based system. Id. at 1137. Under this
new bureaucratic model, welfare workers did not need to be trained social workers because
their role did not require individual assessment. Id. Instead, workers were seen as eligibility technicians who simply applied specific and mandatory rules to any given situation. Id.
at 1139-40.

83. See MARYJO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO
REFORM 16 (1994) (describing the change that took place in 1969 as social workers who
required college or master's degrees were replaced with eligibility technicians with no requisite specialized training).
84. See Diller, supra note 22, at 1161-62 (contrasting and providing examples of
caseworkers' past responsibility to determine eligibility with the many roles and responsibilities caseworkers have under the current welfare system). Professor Gilman writes:
[F]ront-line workers generally now engage in a variety of counseling and evaluative tasks. These include educating applicants about the TANF program; assessing their work histories and attempts to obtain employment; reviewing their
eligibility for entitlement benefits such as SSI, Medicaid, and food stamps; determining their eligibility for cash grants, loans, or other services to divert them
from the TANF program; assisting them in securing child support from noncustodial parents; helping them with job searches; assessing their child care and
transportation needs, as well as domestic violence problems or alcohol or drug
abuse; drafting individualized plants to attain economic self-sufficiency; and assisting them in locating job training, GED, ESOL, and other skill building activities.
Gilman, supra note 14, at 580. For a historical review of the changing role of the welfare
administrator, see BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 83, at 8-27. The role of the welfare administrator has evolved since welfare began. For a historical analysis of the caseworker as social
worker, see LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY
OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 102-05, 162-64 (1994).
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cipient. In this new role, caseworkers obtain assessment information,85 tasaeit
translate the information into obligations and monitor
compliance with the obligations.8 6 These terms not only determine
the particular obligations each recipient must meet, but also form the
basis of possible sanctions against recipients.8 7
Devolution of administrative authority from the federal government to the states, and often from states to local governments, has
resulted in additional problems of discretion.8 8 Especially in those
states that have devolved authority for welfare administration to the
local governments, preliminary information reveals that caseworkers
are actually operating with greatly increased discretion. 89 For example, Colorado has devolved authority to administer TANF to each of
its sixty-three counties." While the state imposes some mandates, 91
essentially each county has the ability to design its own TANF program.9 2 Further, despite federal and state statutory obligations to
adopt rules and regulations governing the administration of bene-

85. An individual seeking assistance who applies for TANF benefits must undergo an
assessment by a caseworker. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1) (Supp. V 1999) (explaining that
during this assessment, the worker is charged with ascertaining "the skills, prior work experience, and employability of each recipient"). According to the statute, the worker then
develops an Individual Responsibility Plan (IRP), which sets forth the applicant's obligations should he or she wish to obtain benefits. Id. § 608(b) (2).
86. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES, at xii (1980) (arguing that "the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the
routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work
pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out").
87. For a complete list of the federal statutory provisions regarding which sanctions are
mandatory by states and which are optional, see GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 12, at
9, app. II.
88. SeeJOEL F. HANDLER, DowN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION
AND EMPOWERMENrT 41-47 (1996) (describing the general problems devolution creates for
domestic social programs).
89. See generally LoVEjoY & RYAN, supranote 25 (describing devolution schemes in Colorado, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin). The increased discretion is also
accompanied by a lack of administrative accountability mechanisms. Id. at 9. Requirements of notice and comment rulemaking set forth in federal and state Administrative
Procedure Acts and state freedom of information acts are not binding on local governments. Diller, supra note 22, at 1190.
90. See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2-712, 26-2-714 (West Supp. 2001) (creating a system of block grants from state to county governments to administer the TANF program);
LoVEjoY & RYAN, supra note 25, at 11.
91. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-709 (setting statewide cash assistance
amounts); id. § 26-2-710 (establishing a statewide administrative review system).
92. See id. § 26-2-705(2)(c) (explaining that one purpose of the Colorado Works Program is to allow increased county responsibility in implementing the works program).
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fits, 93 of the sixty-three counties, thirty-four are operating without any
written rules or regulations to govern caseworker decision-making.9 4
These findings raise significant concern because, as other scholars
have concluded, poor people and other minorities tend to be worse
off when benefit decisions are made by local governmental entities.9 5
Likewise, privatization and the use of private management tech-

niques in public administration also have increased discretion in the
administration of benefits.9 6 Private contractors might not be subject
to the APA notice and comment rulemaking requirements and freedom of information statutes, decreasing both the ability for and effectiveness of any public input.9 7 Further, some private management
models use funding incentives or performance-based evaluation to
govern behavior in the workplace," which, especially when coupled
with increased discretion, may lead to biased decision-making.9 9 Finally, private contractors may understand their goals as reducing the
number of people on welfare rather than providing needed services
or assistance to individuals.' 0 All of these factors create a system that
appears to increase the discretion of welfare administrators to the detriment of recipients.
In addition to the concerns noted above, increased discretion in
the welfare context may lead to unequal treatment between similarly
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (B) (iii) (requiring states to use fair and objective criteria
for the delivery of benefits); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-715(1)(a)(I) (requiring counties to
administer the works program using fair and objective criteria).
94. See Cimini, supra note 31 (documenting initial implementation problems in Colorado). Currently, of the sixty-three counties operating without procedures, thirty-two are
operating with other incomplete tools to assist in the administration of the program, including charts, graphs, and lists to guide caseworker decision-making. Five counties are
using old AFDC policies to administer the new TANF program.
95. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:Accounting
for the Tyranny of State Majorities,99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 554-55 (1999).
96. See Bezdek, supra note 81, at 1568-70 (discussing how privatization has decreased
government accountability); Diller, supra note 22, at 1127 ("This ... discretion . . . is an
outgrowth of a broad movement toward the use of private sector management techniques
in public administration."). For a historical description of decentralization and privatization in the welfare state, see HANDLER, supra note 88.
97. Diller, supra note 22, at 1190; see also Bezdek, supra note 81, at 1564 (explaining
that these protective mechanisms existed under the former AFDC program); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES CHALLENGES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS

14 (1997) [hereinafter GAO, SocL4

SER-

VICES PRIVATIZATION].

98. See Bezdek, supra note 81, at 1566-67.
99. See GAO, SOCIAL SERVICES PRIVATIZATION, supra note 97, at 16 ("Some experts in
social service privatization have expressed concern that contractors, especially when motivated by profit-making goals and priorities, may be less inclined to provide equal access to
services for all eligible beneficiaries.").
100. See Diller, supra note 22, at 1180-82.
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situated applicants or recipients'o a and unfair or inappropriate application of discretion on an individual basis.'0 2 Both unequal and unfair treatment may result from a caseworker's individual biases and
beliefs."0 3 Moreover, if the increase in discretion derives, at least in
part, from the lack of written standards, a recipient may have no right
to a meaningful hearing or judicial review.' 0 4
Prior to passage of the Welfare Reform Act, recipients of welfare
could invoke procedural due process to protect against caseworker
101. For example, assume Recipient A and Recipient B live in the same county and go to
the same welfare office. Recipients A and B are both single parents with high school degrees and two children over six years of age, but minimal work history. Assume further
that Recipient A is assigned to Caseworker 1, a middle aged woman who has been working
in the welfare administrative system for five years and is a team manager within her unit,
while Recipient B is assigned to Caseworker 2, a young woman just out of college who has
been on the job for one month. After the assessment, Caseworker 1 prepares an IRP that
includes twenty hours of work search each week with no other obligations, but also gives
bus tickets and child care assistance to make sure Recipient A can comply with the twentyhour obligations. Caseworker 2 prepares an IRP that includes twenty hours of work search,
required attendance at job training classes fifteen hours a week, and no transportation or
child care assistance. Despite the fact that both recipients have similar family make-ups,
educational backgrounds, and work experiences, under the new legislation workers can
employ their discretion resulting in unequal treatment of recipients with similar
backgrounds.
102. For example, Recipient C, a single mother with one child who has a GED but no
work history, is assessed by Caseworker 3. On the basis of her assessment, Caseworker 3
creates an IRP for Recipient C that requires Recipient C to conduct a job search thirty
hours a week, but includes no supportive or job training services. This recipient may have
a claim that the new caseworker treated her unfairly by not providing her sufficient assistance that would enable her to meet the obligations of her IRP.
103. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (stating that "the possibility for
honest error or irritable misjudgment [is] too great, to allow termination of aid without
giving the recipient" notice and a hearing); see also FRANCIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 133-35 (1993)
(describing the ways in which "black relief mothers" were treated differently than their
white counterparts under AFDC programs from 1935 to 1961);JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 26 (1991) ("As part of the dominant social and economic order, welfare policy has served the societal values of racial
hostility, discrimination, subordination, and exclusion."); see also Susan T. Gooden, All
Things Not BeingEqual: Differences in Caseworker Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients,
4 HARv. J. AsR.-AM. PUB. POL'y 23, 32 (1998) (finding that "caseworkers encourage education investment among white welfare recipients, but not black welfare recipients").
104. See, e.g., Hide-A-Way Massage Parlor v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 597 P.2d 564, 566
(Colo. 1979) (determining that, in the absence of adequately defined standards, neither
the public nor the courts have any means of knowing in advance what evidence is material); see also Elizondo v. Dep't of Revenue, 570 P.2d 518, 522 (Colo. 1977) (finding that in
the absence of rules and regulations to govern the suspension of licenses, hearing officers
would not be able to determine what evidence and arguments are relevant); County Dep't
of Pub. Welfare v. Deaconess Hosp., Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
("lJ]udicial review is hindered when agencies operate in the absence of established
guidelines.").
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abuse of discretion. ° 5 This due process right was based on a recipient's legitimate expectation in receipt of benefits.1 1 6 However, in
light of the statutory no entitlement provision and increased discretion, recipients can no longer rely exclusively upon legitimate expectations entitlement analysis for due process protections." 7 Under
legitimate expectation entitlement analysis, the finding that an individual has a protected property interest depends in part upon the
amount of discretion afforded the administrator of public assistance.'1 8 As the administrator's discretion increases, the likelihood of
a court finding that a recipient has a legitimate expectation in the
benefit decreases.1 0 9 In the context of welfare reform, this legitimate
expectations analysis is of questionable value to recipients attempting
to secure due process protections because the actual implementation
105. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
106. See id. at 262 & n.8. The question of whether legitimate expectations create a property interest is directly related to the amount of discretion afforded the administrators
under the implementing statute. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Where the discretion afforded the administrators is very limited, such as where there exist
express statutory criteria for the benefit, it is more likely that the court will find a property
interest. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. When the amount of discretion afforded the
decision-maker increases, it is less clear whether there exists a legitimate expectation. Compare Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 462 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that there was no
entitlement to federally subsidized housing because private landlords had discretion in the
selection of tenants), with Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that there was an entitlement to federally subsidized housing as administered because the regulations circumscribed the landlord's discretion).
However, the Supreme Court has still found a constitutionally protected interest when
such discretion is coupled with mandatory language and substantive predicates that limit
discretion. See Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378 (1987) (finding a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in parole release despite the broad discretion afforded administrators because there was mandatory language in the statute which created a presumption
that parole would be granted once the statutorily designated findings were made); Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (finding that while the mere existence of procedural
guidelines to direct prison officials in decision-making does not, in itself, create a liberty
interest, mandatory statutory language requiring such procedures does create legitimate
expectations that form the basis of a liberty interest). But see Olim v. Wakinekon, 461 U.S.
238, 249 (1983) (finding that Hawaii's prison regulations did not create a constitutionally
protected liberty interest because the regulations contained no limitations on the administrator's exercise of discretion).
107. But see Cimini, supra note 31 (arguing that legitimate expectations analysis may be
adequate in and of itself to create procedure due process rights in recipients).
108. Id.
109. For an analysis of the relationship between lack of discretion and legitimate expectations, see supra note 106; see also Wash. Legal Clinic for Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that the less discretion the state official has to determine a benefit, the more likely the benefit is a property interest); Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 874
(1981) (stating that "the more circumscribed... the government's discretion (under substantive state or federal law) to withhold a benefit, the more likely that benefit constitutes
'property' . ..").
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of welfare reform has resulted in increased discretion to welfare administrators t '0 as well as the potential for abuse of that discretion. If
recipients rely exclusively upon the finding of legitimate expectations
to assure due process protections, recipients may be left with little to
no protections at the time when such protections are most needed."t '
In the alternative, recipients might obtain procedural due process protections through a different source-namely that of contracts.
Basing the due process analysis upon contracts removes the link between discretion and the existence of a property interest, thus providing recipients an alternate source of due process protections despite
the current discretionary administration of welfare. The next section
of the Article will explore this alternative means of due process protections and propose that the TANF contract, both the macro social contract and the micro individual contract, mandate some due process
protections.
III.

THE WELFARE REFORM ACT'S CONTRACTUAL MODEL PROVIDES A
SOURCE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTION

Given the problems of unfairness, inequality, and unaccountability associated with increased discretion in the administration
of welfare, this section articulates a new basis for due process protections based on the law of contracts. Utilizing a traditionally private
law analysis-as opposed to one based on public law legitimate expectation-may provide new protection against the unfair, unequal, and
unaccountable government action described in the preceding sections." 2 In this section, the Article explores the implications of con110. Cimini, supra note 31.
111. Some may argue that the constitutional protections are unnecessary because many
states have a statute protecting the right to a hearing if benefits are terminated. See, e.g.,
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-710 (West Supp. 2001). Despite the fact that some states
have a statutorily guaranteed right to a hearing, there are many reasons why the analysis
offered in this Article is important. First, not every state has such statutory guarantees.
Second, simply because a state now guarantees a hearing by statute does not ensure that
such a statute will remain. Legislators may simply amend current statutes and abolish hearing rights altogether. The ability of legislators to amend makes the constitutional component of the analysis even more important. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, this
response fails to take into account the most basic concern raised by the devolved contractual model-the fundamental absence of governmental accountability that implicates the
rights of recipients even prior to the hearing stage. These concerns are raised by the increased absence of rules or standards, the change in role of the welfare administrator, the
actual implementation of devolution, and the increasing use of privatization in welfare
administration.
112. But see Simon, supra note 59, at 1437-41 (arguing that analogizing public assistance
to private law norms, including property and contract, ignores the underlying issue of
wealth redistribution to assure a minimal standard of living).
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13
tractual agreements between recipients and government entities'
and determines that implied and express terms of the agreement between the government and welfare recipients may create due process
protections. First, on a macro level, the Article examines the concept
of a social contract between the government and recipient which requires, at a minimum, that the government not act in an arbitrary
manner. Second, on a micro level, using a private law contractual
analysis, the agreement between the government and recipients may
constitute a contract that forms a property interest." 4 If the agreement were to create an enforceable contract, it would be legally cognizable as personal property and may thereby constitute a property
interest, entitling the recipient to procedural due process protections."' Together, these macro (broad/implied) and micro (specific/express) aspects of the government contract place some
limitations upon the government's otherwise unfettered actions in the
administration of welfare.

A.

The Social Contract: The Macro or Implied Contract Between the
Government and the Populace

This section examines the existence of an implied macro contract
between the government and recipients of public assistance that derives from the concept of a social contract.' 1 6 In the first part of this
113. Some scholars have explored the use of the private doctrine of contracts in traditionally public arenas. SeeJody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543 (2000). Professor Freeman argues that the administrative law arena is no longer
hierarchical, but is instead based on a horizontal set of negotiated relationships between
the private and the public realm. Id. at 571-74. Given this new model, the author identifies
contracts as a new accountability mechanism. Id. at 667-71; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 29-54 (1983) (considering the use
of tort law as a mechanism for establishing accountability for the actions of street-level
officials); Martha M. Ertman, CommercializingMarriage:A ProposalFor Valuing Women's Work
Through PremaritalSecurity Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REv. 17, 19-21 (1998) (proposing that the
commercialization of marriage, through the use of security agreements, will help solve the
financial difficulties encountered by divorced homemakers); Patricia J. Williams, Commercial Rights and ConstitutionalWrongs, 49 MD. L. REv. 293, 293 (1990) (attempting to reduce
"the all-encompassing social contract to a manageable, private contract context...").
114. While this Article identifies contracts as a possible theoretical foundation upon
which to explore the procedural due process rights of welfare recipients in an era of devolution, additional private law analogies exist including tort. For a discussion of how the
tort analogy reconciles American individualist tradition with the needs-based government
redistribution program more effectively than property or contracts, see Moore, supra note
59, at 927-28.
115. For a range of views on the impact of finding an entitlement to welfare, see Handler, supra note 53, at 947-74.
116. For an overview of the use of social contract theory in American case law, see Anita
L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REv. 1 (1999).
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section the Article explores the existence of this type of social contract
and finds that a social contract exists. This section then questions the
underlying terms of such a contract. Finally, this section examines the
due process implications of an existing social contract and posits that
at a minimum, the existence of a social contract mandates that the
government not act in an arbitrary manner.
Welfare discourse is deeply-rooted in the idea of a social contract.
This idea has been most frequently used by both scholars and politicians to justify increased obligations upon welfare recipients. 1 7 This
section attempts to invert this dynamic and utilize notions of social
contract to instead place affirmative obligations on the government.
Specifically, the concept of the macro, or implied, contract is employed to ensure that the government not act arbitrarily and without
restraint.
1. Existence of a Social Contract.-The idea of a social contract exists in both historical and current discussions about the relationship
between government and its people. This Article identifies three contexts in which scholars, academics, and politicians have engaged in
discourse regarding the existence of a social contract. Initially, this
section addresses the discourse among political theorists who discuss
the existence and scope of the social contract as a justification for
political authority. Similarly, primary sources fundamental to the
democratic model of governance in the United States contain significant threads of social contract theory. Finally, a large body of social
contract rhetoric permeates social welfare discourse and supports the
existence of a social contract, especially in the arena of public benefits."1 8 All three of these bases support the understanding that a social
contract exists between the government and its people.
a. Political Theory and Social Contract.-In order to distinguish among political theorists' views on social contract, this Article
distinguishes between early theorists and classical theorists. Those
117. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MED, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 3-4 (1986) (arguing that the
main problem with the welfare state is its permissiveness, and that a more efficient welfare
system would arise if recipients worked in return for their support). Social contract theory
has been used in a variety of harmful contexts. Contractarian theory was used by antebellum courts to justify slavery and political exclusion. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 940
(1991) (explaining that social contract theory was used to argue that African-Americans
and Catholics are not entided to all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution).
118. For a critique of social contract theory as patriarchal, racist, and invasive of sexual
and reproductive freedom, see April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race,
and the Male Sex-Right, 75 OR. L. Rsv. 1037 (1996).
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identified as early theorists were among the first to originate the idea
of a contractual relationship between the ruler and the people. As
such, the early theorists devised a range of ideas regarding the existence and purpose of the social contract." 9 Manegold of
Lautenbach, a late eleventh century scholar, originally devised the
concept of a "contractarian" agreement regarding the existence of political authority. 2 ° Specifically, Manegold argued that political authority existed to meet certain needs of the people, and that the
authority specific rulers had over people stemmed from the people's
recognition of this fact.' 2 1 Under this "contractarian" arrangement,
the people conferred on the ruler a "conditional authority" for their
own benefit. 122 Engelbert of Volkersdorf, a later medieval scholar,
based his theory on the concept of an "original contract."1 23 Under
this theory, "all kingdoms ...

originated when men, following nature

and reason, chose a ruler and bound themselves to (conditional) obedience in a 'contract of subjection ...
12 4
and preserved.'

in order to be ruled, protected

"Partnership" created by contract was a different version of the
social contract espoused by Mario Salamonio around 1511.125
Salamonio argued that political or civil society is a partnership among
12 6
individual citizens created by contract among them as individuals.
According to Salamonio, "[t]he terms of the contract are the laws of
the state, without which no state can exist, and which are binding on
' 27
all members-including the .

.

. ruler."

During the religious wars of the 1570s, Juniun Brutus explored
the relationship between the concept of a divine contract and a social
contract. 128 According to Brutus, the first contract was the divine contract, which set forth the role of people and government as part of
"the divine plan of the universe." 129 This first contract was "a covenant between God on the one hand, and ruler and people on the
other .

. . .""0

Under this contract, the ruler and the people had to

119. See generally Michael Lessnoff, Introduction to SocAL CoNTRAcr THEORY (Michael
Lessnoff ed., 1990) (describing the development of social contract theory).
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id. at 6-7.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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"'serve God according to His will."' 1 31 The second contract was a mutual contract between the ruler and the people requiring the people
13 2
to obey faithfully and the ruler to govern lawfully.
The classical theorists expanded upon the initial contractarian
ideas espoused by the early theorists. This Article focuses on three
classical social contract theorists who made significant contributions
to the development of social contract theory: Thomas Hobbes, JeanJacques Rousseau, and John Locke.' 3 3 Each of these theorists vary on
three major components of the social contract theory: the state of nature prior to the social contract, the justification for creation of government, and a description, or the terms, of the social contract itself.
According to Hobbes, the state of nature was so unstable that it
amounted to a state of war.1 34 Given limited resources and the equal
desire for such resources, people would fight among themselves for
control over the limited resources.' 3 5 Therefore, Hobbes argued that
the only way to create a tolerable social structure is to create a social
contract between individuals and the sovereign, under which individuals agree to transfer natural freedom to the sovereign in order to keep
peace.' 3 6 Under this theory, an unchallengeable sovereign is the imperative function of the social contract.' 3 7 Hobbes's social contract
requires a mutual transferring of rights, after which both the government and the individual assume obligations.'
As opposed to the Hobbesian view, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
state of nature people are free and equal.' 3 9 But according to Rousseau, war results from social relationships and from the development
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. For a critique of Hobbes, Rosseau, and Locke, see generally Bertram Morris, The
Substance of the Social Contract, in ESSAYS IN POLITIcAL THEORY 113 (Milton R. Konvitz &
Arthur E. Murphy eds., 1948). Morris argues that the fatal flaw of classical social contract
theory is the absence of any connection between theory and practice-"namely, how the
contract is to be known." Id. at 122.
134. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651).
135. Id. at 102.
136. Id. at 107-08. As Hobbes states:
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and
defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other
men against himselfe. For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any
thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 142-43.
138. Id. at 143-44.
139. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 323, 347, 363 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
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of private property.1 40 In this state, those with material wealth seek to
leave the state of nature to preserve the inequality. 4 ' Rousseau argued that poor people "agree" to this system to protect their freedom
from those with more wealth. 142 For Rousseau, the construction of
the social contract is a way to resolve the problems of political subjugation and inequality.14 3 Under this social contract, people relinquish
the right to total alienation and acquire civil rights-the restitution of
what has been relinquished. 144 Thus, Rousseau's social contract is
based on mutual consent and reciprocity; the social contract provides
citizens with
certain protections while creating obligations owed to
5
society.

14

Locke likewise finds equality in the state of nature.' 46 However,
Locke views the problem in the state of nature as the lack of any effective centralized mechanism to enforce the laws of nature. 147 For this
reason, Locke views the sole purpose of the creation of the state to
protect existing "natural law. " 4 ' Thus, based on Locke's view, people
140. JEAN JACQUES RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 6 (Charles Frankel trans., Hafner
Pub. Co. 1947) (1762) [hereinafter THE SoctI CoNTRAcr].
141. Rousseau, supra note 139, at 354-55.
142. Id. at 355-56.
143. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 140, at 14-15. As Rousseau wrote:
Where shall we find a form of association which will defend and protect with the
whole common force the person and the property of each associate, and by which
every person, while uniting himself with all, shall obey only himself and remain as
free as before? Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract
gives the solution.
Id.
144. See id. at 15.
Finally, each person gives himself to all, and so not to any one individual; and as
there is no one associate over whom the same right is not acquired which is ceded
to him by others, each gains an equivalent for what he loses, and finds his force
increased for preserving that which he possesses.
Id,
145. Rousseau, supra note 139, at 354; THE SOCIAL CONrRACT, supra note 140, at 15.
146. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1964) (1690). Locke stated:
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health,
Liberty, or Possessions. For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent,
and infinitely wise Maker ... they are his Property.
Id.
147. Id. at 300. As Locke stated:
To avoid this State of War ... is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into
Society, and quitting the State of Nature. For where there is an Authority, a
Power on Earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of
the State of War is excluded, and the Controversie is decided by that Power.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
148. Id. at 299.
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do not give up natural liberty, but they do give up their right to enforce the laws of nature. 149 The actual social contract that Locke envisioned is distinct from Hobbes and Rousseau because it is not based
upon mutuality of obligations. Instead, the social contract is an agreement with duties delegated only to the government, while citizens retain their rights.' 5 ° Further, because under Locke's vision all persons
are naturally free, each person must consent to be subjected to civil
society.15 1 Once the civil society has been created by the consent of all
members, the majority of the community can determine the limits of
the state so long as the parameters of the state do not conflict with
15 2
natural rights.

b. The Social Contract and Democracy in the United States.-The
early and classical social contract theorists laid the foundation for the
incorporation of social contract theory in the fundamental documents
that underlie and support our country's democratic model of governance. 15 1 In fact, those who contributed to the documents that form
the foundation of the United States democracy significantly relied
upon these theorists. 154 Thus, it is not surprising that the themes
which embody notions of social contract-government by consent of
the people and individual rights of people that cannot be unjustly infringed upon by government 1 5 -are woven throughout the basic documents. 156 The reliance upon these themes can be traced back to
149. Id. at 301.
150. Id. at 301-03.
151. Id. at 301.
152. Id. at 302.
153. For support of the proposition that social contractarian philosophy influenced the
founding of the United States and the Constitution, see PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE
TO REVOLUTION 27-28 (1972) (arguing that social contract theory in part shaped the American revolutionary movement); JOHN WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 45
(Jack Scott ed., 1982); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (equating the
United States Constitution with the formation of a social compact).
154. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1995) ("An examination of the phraseology and themes of the Declaration of Independence shows what most Americans have
long accepted: that our founding document is an expression of Lockian neutral-rights political philosophy.").
155. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 38 (1953). According to Friedmann, there are two
essential features of the doctrine of social contract. First, from a state of nature, in which
there exist no laws, no order, and no government, people have "passed to a state of society,
by means of a contract in which they undertake to respect each other and live in peace
(pactum unionis)." Second, to this contract is added a second pact by which the people
"thus united undertake to obey a government which they themselves have chosen (pactum
subiectionis)." Id. at 39.
156. Scholars disagree about the precise character of the relationship between the law
of the United States and social contractarian thought. See STEVEN M. DwORETZ, THE UN-
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before the Declaration of Independence and are found
in that docu57
ment as well as in many others created thereafter.
In 1776, Thomas Jefferson relied upon social contract concepts
espoused by John Locke in drafting the Declaration of Independence.' 5 8 The document sets forth a series of individual natural rights
that are protected from government interference.1 59 The document
employs express language that connotes mutuality between the gov60
ernment and the people and consent by the people to be governed.
Specifically, the Declaration of Independence reads:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed . . . with certain

unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness." That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed ....
Thus, consistent with concepts of contract theory and government by
consent, individual freedoms are protected by granting only certain
authority to the government.
These themes were also incorporated into state constitutions
drafted both before and after the federal constitution.' 6 2 After the
American Revolution, individual states began to create state-specific
constitutions that were based in large part upon the contract theory of
government. 63 The principles underlying the state constitutions
LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5-6 (1990);JOHN
C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 170-76 (1943); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79J. AM. HisT. 11, 13-17 (1992).
VARNISHED DOCTRINE: LocKEJ,

157. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (accusing the British

government of breaching its social contract with the colonists through various acts of "tyranny," and declaring it to be the "right" and "duty" of those governed to "throw off such
government, and to provide new guards for their future security"); see also infta notes 162170 and accompanying text (identifying individual state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and the federal Constitution as later documents in which reliance on these
same themes is evident).
158. MAX J. SKIDMORE, AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 46 (1978).
159. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (identifying the unalienable rights

to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness).
160. See SKIDMORE, supra note 158, at 46.
161. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2.

162. See SKIDMORE, supra note 158, at 53-54 (discussing themes and concepts evident in
the state constitutions); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 283-91 (1969) (describing the turn to a Lockean social contract model

made by the state governments in the years following 1776).
163. SKIDMORE, supra note 158, at 52-53. As Skidmore writes:
After the Revolution,... state leaders combined English traditions modified
by the unique American environment with the notion of compact, or the contract
theory of government, to produce something more than the limited statements of
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stemmed from the apprehension and skepticism of government
power. Due to these concerns, most states adopted Bills of Rights that
created a set of individual liberties with which the government could
not interfere. 6 4 In addition, states formulated a system of checks and
balances and separation of powers in order to constrain centralized
government power.

1 65

The federal Constitution mirrors many of the principles articulated in state constitutions.' 6 6 The first attempt at a national constitution resulted in the Articles of Confederation, which was completed in
1777.167 Without complete unanimity surrounding the Articles, the
Constitutional Convention was convened in 1787 to amend the Articles and create a more workable solution.1 6 8 After much controversy
surrounding ratification, the parties reached a compromise promising
that the first Congress under the new government would propose a
1 69
Bill of Rights for states to ratify.
The rhetoric and documents created during the 1787 Constitutional Convention recognized the importance of social contract and
Lockean principles.' 7 0 Government authority is based on the princithe past. The American constitutions thus produced, based as they were upon a
contract theory that embodied a conception of the higher law, became the first
truly comprehensive documents of politics, the first writings serving as the foundations of entire states and their political subdivisions.
Id. Similarly, Professor Wood writes:
Under the changing exigencies of their polemics and politics, Americans needed
some new contractual analogy to explain their evolving relationships among
themselves and with the state. Only a social agreement among the people, only
such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing idea
of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from
and controlling of all the institutions of government.
WooD, supra note 162, at 283.
164. SKIDMORE, supra note 158, at 53.
165. See id. (describing the ways in which some states separated the executive from the
legislative branches and created independent courts); see also WooD, supra note 162, at 15061 (describing the sources and development of the American constitutional principle of
separation of powers).
166. Among these principles were a general mistrust of unchecked governmental
power, especially of a powerful executive; the notion that "power should check power,"
which is embodied in the system of checks and balances; and the recognition of certain
individual liberties. See SKIDMORE, supra note 158, at 53 (discussing general principles
found in state constitutions).
167. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE
FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 4 (Patrick T. Conley & John P.
Kaminski eds., 1988).
168. SKIDMORE, supra note 158, at 58.
169. Id. at 59.
170. See id. at 60 ("The major principles of the Constitution were highly consistent with
the Lockean foundations of much of American political thought .... There was no question that the consent principle was valid and that power should be considered as flowing
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pie of consent of the people;1 7 1 the power of the government to act
flows from the populace. In order to protect against power imbalances, there is a system of checks and balances and a separation
of
73
powers. 1 72 Further, the powers of the government are limited.1

In sum, the Declaration of Independence, original state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and the federal Constitution with
its accompanying Bill of Rights all based their notions of the structure
of democratic government on ideas of social contract. These documents amount to a formalization of the social contract between the
government and its people.1 74 Our current system of laws and regulations recognize the notions of social contract through mandatory
compliance with constitutional guarantees as well as through popular
notions of inherent democratic principles. Thus, the concept of the
social contract as historically developed and currently implemented
175
permeates our current system of laws.
c. Social Welfare Discourse.-In addition to social contract
theory as originally formulated and supplanted throughout the evolution of our democratic model of governance, the idea of social contract has particularly permeated academic and political social welfare
discourse. Indeed, as the next section illustrates, the concept of the
social contract is evident in various provisions of welfare legislation
from the New Deal to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act itself.

Academics and scholars interested in social welfare concepts have
long debated the terms and scope of the social contract. According to
some scholars, the New Deal was a bargained-for surrendering of

power to the new regulatory state in exchange for economic protecfrom the people."). At least one court has characterized the ratification of the U.S. Constitution as a social contract. Von Lusch v. State, 387 A.2d 306, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1978).
171. See T1-E FEDERALIST No. 22, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000) ("The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT
OF THE PEOPLE.-).
172. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 29, at 48 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000).
173. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.

174. SeeJanice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at its Development
and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 115, 147 (1997) ("Social contracts may be formalized, as in a constitution, or they may
be the 'legal fictions' that legitimize governmental authority.").
175. See Allen, supra note 116, at 5-6 (asserting that social contract theory has influenced
case law deciding many constitutional issues, including slavery, self-incrimination, and the
right to privacy).
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tions for those whose access to economic citizenship was depleted.' 7 6
At various times throughout history, academics have also questioned
whether the social contract, in the context of welfare, was being
honored.1 7 7 More current academic debate has focused on recipients' obligations, including the idea that the social contract is used to
justify additional obligations upon recipients and to terminate assistance for noncompliance with the compact.'17 Other scholars argue
that the problems with the current social welfare system are systemic,
79
and that we need to create a new social contract.1
Politically, in the context of public assistance, passage of the New
Deal in 1935 marked the creation of a social contract on the federal
level.18 0 Even the name the "New Deal" connotes a redefining of the
bargain between the government and its people.' 8 '
Between 1935 and 1994, the welfare social contract went through
varying permutations, and in response to demographic and political
changes, the terms of the social contract varied.18 2 However, consis176. See Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social
Security Privatization,41 B.C. L. REv. 975, 1037 (2000) (interpreting Reich's view of the New
Deal).
177. Reich, supra note 52, at 817-19. As Professor Reich has written:
The New Prperty argued that, if the new social contract was to be respected, welfare state protections and benefits for the middle class and the poor must be
treated as entitlements--a substitute for old forms of property....
...
Only if the new forms of wealth were protected by both substantive and
procedural due process would the New Deal prove to be not merely a one-way
transfer of power to the state, but a two-way bargain, with the people receiving a
quid pro quo of economic rights in return.

Id.
178. MEAD, supra note 117, at 3-4. Professor Mead finds that if the government required
recipients to work or function in return for support, the welfare program would be more
successful. Id. at 3-4. He writes: "For recipients, work must be viewed, not as an expression
of self-interest, but as an obligation owed to society. At the same time, to fulfill this obligation would permit the poor a kind of freedom that government benefits alone never can."
Id. at 70.
179. See MARTIN CARNOY ET AL., A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: THE ECONOMY AND GOVERN-

MENT AFTER REAGAN 6-7 (1983). The authors argue that big business has broken the New
Deal social contract by moving to countries with better business climates, speculating in
real estate, and seeking growth through mergers. The authors propose that the national
government should "act as an agent of democratization for the public" by giving workers a
more powerful voice in corporate governance. Id. at 9.
180. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 52, at 817 (noting that the New Deal was a "revised social
contract," under which the federal government promised "protection against the extremes
of economic dislocation").
181. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-30 (1991)

(arguing that

reformers during the New Deal altered constitutional development).
182. In 1950, demographic changes led to large increases in the number of recipients
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the cash assistance program
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tent throughout the history of welfare in the United States has been

the concept that the government owes minimal support to those without the means or ability to otherwise obtain it."8 3 Then, beginning in
the 1980s, the concept of the government's obligation began to develop into one of mutuality, in which the welfare recipient as well as
the government had social obligations.1 8 4
The clamor surrounding welfare reform gained widespread national attention preceding the 1992 presidential election when both
18 5
candidates promised fundamental changes to the welfare system.
In 1994, after the Republicans gained control of the House and Senate for the first time in forty years, House Republicans, led by Representatives Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey, published the Contract with

for adults with dependent children. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE
STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 309 (6th ed. 1999). Not only did the

number of recipients increase, but the racial makeup of those receiving assistance
changed. Id. What previously had been a pool of recipients comprised largely of white
widowed women was now shifting to a pool comprised largely of single black women with
illegitimate children. Id. Between 1960 and 1970, technological innovations decreased the
need for agricultural workers in rural areas, and large numbers of persons migrated to
urban centers, increasing the overall number of recipients receiving AFDC assistance. Id.
at 313-14. In response to the large increase in number of recipients, the government
changed the terms of the social contract. Id. at 320-21. Under this new version of the
social contract, states received increased financial support to run the welfare programs and
were in turn able to broaden the scope of services provided to recipients. Id.
183. See Burton v. Thornburgh, 541 F. Supp. 168, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("The United
States Supreme Court has never held that individuals have a right to receive welfare or
other types of subsistence payments.").
184. Between 1980 and 1990, the government's social contract regarding welfare began
to constrict. See TRATrNER, supra note 182, at 363-82. The federal government began providing financial support to the states, and recipients had to comply with additional conditions in order to receive benefits. See id. In 1988 the federal government enacted the
Family Support Act, legislation specifically detailing the component of the social contract.
Id. at 376. The Family Support Act created the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Program
(JOBS), under which any recipient of welfare with a child over three years of age had to
work in order to receive assistance. Id. In social contract terms, JOBS began a trend
whereby government placed increasing obligations upon recipients as a condition of receipt of assistance. Id. This trend flourished from 1988 to 1992 as states were increasingly
granted waivers from federal requirements. Id.at 380-81. The waivers permitted states to
change the terms of the social contract by deviating from various federal statutory requirements. Many of the deviations chosen by states mandated recipients to comply with additional obligations. For example, waivers were granted that permitted states to deny welfare
benefits to unmarried mothers who gave birth to children while receiving welfare benefits.
Other waivers were granted to states that permitted welfare agencies to require a certain
level of school attendance for children. Id. at 380-81.
185. See, e.g., D'Jamila Salem, Where the Candidates Stand on: Welfare, L.A. TIMEs, May 17,
1992, at A4 (reporting on the emergence of welfare reform as a major issue in the
campaign).
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America.186 The Contract with America contained numerous references
to the social contract. Specifically, the Contract with America purported
to be "an agreement and a covenant between our ... elected representatives and the American people with whom we sought a common
bond."1" 7 The Contract with America further states that if government
representatives break the contract, the people should remove them
from office. 8 8 The Contract with America also dealt specifically with the
topic of welfare reform, 8 9 identifying the perceived problems of welfare as recipient dependency upon the government, illegitimacy, lack
of recipient work ethic, and inflated government spending on social
welfare programs.' 90 The "contract" was designed to cure these
problems by placing additional obligations upon recipients and requiring them to take "personal responsibility for the decisions they
make."''
Like their academic counterparts, social welfare advocates also
use social contract rhetoric and ideas.' 9 2 For example, a task force in
New York state was appointed by then Governor Mario Cuomo to ad-

dress questions surrounding poverty and welfare. Its report, published in December 1986, was entitled A New Social Contract:Rethinking
the Nature and Purpose of Public Assistance.'9 ' The report envisioned "a
new social contract based on the mutual responsibilities of citizens
and society," which has as its goal the inclusion of all citizens in the
economic mainstream.' 9 4 According to this report, recipients would
fulfill their part of the contract through work, training, and education. Society would have the responsibility to provide to recipients,
for a reasonable period, the relevant education, training, and support
services necessary to enable the recipient to achieve self-sufficiency.' 9 5
While the concept of welfare as a social contract is exemplified in
the evolution of welfare policy, perhaps the most striking evidence of
the existence of a social contract is the Welfare Reform Act itself. The

186. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas
eds., 1994).
187. Id. at 6.
188. See id. at 22.
189. Id. at 66-67.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 65.
192. See generally HOMEBASE, INFUSING HUMANITY INTO WELFARE REFORM: A STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1995) (arguing that the protection of children
should be one of the bases for a new social contract).
193. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
RETHINKING THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (1986).
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id.
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Act is based in large part upon a contractual model,' 9 6 under which
197 If
the government and recipients enter into plans or agreements.
the recipient satisfactorily completes his or her obligations under the
agreement, the government agrees to pay the recipient monthly cash
assistance. 198 If, on the other hand, the recipient fails to abide by the
terms of the agreement, the government is presumably freed from the
obligation of providing assistance.' 9 9 The underlying principle of the
Act is one of mutual obligations.
Thus, each of these bases-political theorists ideas of social contract, the historical underpinnings of our democratic model, the discourse surrounding social welfare programs, and the Welfare Reform
Act itself-all support the notion that a social contract exists between
the government and the populace.
2.

Terms of the Social Contract.-Definingthe terms of the social

contract is a more difficult inquiry. While contemporary and classical
scholars have written extensively about the existence of the social con196. But see Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 49-51.
[Defendant Adams County]: "[Welfare benefits] are, instead, now more in the
nature of a contractual relationship between the public agency providing the benefits and the individual, rather than in the nature of an entitlement program."
The Court: "Didn't Congress try to walk a fairly fine line on that one? I mean,
they hesitated to make it clear that it was purely a contractual relationship for the
same reason, they didn't want to call it an entitlement, because if it's a contract,
then you certainly have a property interest in a contract.
The Court: "Or let me ask that a different way. If they have a vested contract
right, doesn't that make it a pretty easy case for me, because that's a property
right?"
[Defendant Adams County]: "[Qjuite frankly, we continue to assert that there is
absolutely no property interest and no liberty interest that plaintiffs can point to
in the receipt of welfare benefits; consequently, plaintiffs have no right to due
process notice."
Id.
197. See supra pt. I. While the federal statute permits and does not mandate each state
to create IRPs, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have in fact adopted some form
of the IRP requirement. See TANF APPLICATIONS, supra note 68. While some states call
these IRPs "plans" and other states call the IRPs "contracts," each state's form of the IRP
creates conditions upon recipients that must be met to receive assistance. Id.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. V 1999) (allowing receipt of benefits to be conditioned on the satisfaction of certain personal obligations imposed on the recipient by the
state). Under the federal statute, the agreement shall include employment goals for the
individuals, affirmative obligations placed upon the recipient, a plan to move the recipient
into private sector employment, and the services the state will provide to the individual. Id.
§ 608(b) (2)(A).
199. See id. § 608(b) (3) (suggesting that a recipient's failure to meet conditions under
the "agreement" will dissolve a state's duty to provide assistance).
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tract, much less attention has been given to its terms. However, because the social contract represents the basic understanding of the
relationship between a people and its government, in the most general sense, the social contract must include the various understandings that we believe are necessary to the very functioning of an
ordered society.
Among the terms of the contemporary United States social contract, therefore, we must include, first, that we operate as a nation of
law. 200 Likewise, the government is structured as a democracy with a
system of checks and balances and separation of powers between the
governmental branches and will enact and fairly enforce the laws necessary for the basic functioning of society. 2 1 Similarly, though the
system of law dictates limitations upon individual behavior, outside
those limitations individual rights will be respected and individuals
will be treated fairly and equally.20 2 Finally, inherent in our notions of
individual liberty and limited government is the understanding that
the government will not act in an arbitrary manner. 20 1 In fact, permitting the government to act in an arbitrary manner would undermine
20 4
the fundamental principles of the social contract.
3. Due ProcessImplications of the Existence of a Social Contract.-The
social contract may prohibit the government from acting in an arbitrary fashion and thereby provide welfare recipients protection against
the unfettered discretion of welfare administrators. 20 5 The operation
200. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It
will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.").
201. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (1997).
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
203. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (explaining that
"[s] ince the time of our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of
the concept to be protection against arbitrary action . . ."). For example, government

agencies are forbidden from acting arbitrarily when their actions affect the property or
liberty interests of individuals. See, e.g., Tourus Records, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
259 F.3d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that an agency must "set forth" reasons for
the decisions it makes to avoid acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner).
204. See Steven J. Heyman, NaturalRights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
237, 247 (2000) (discussing John Locke, and stating that when leaders begin to see themselves as having "a distinct interest from the rest of the community," they may act in an
arbitrary and tyrannical fashion, thereby breaking down the social contract).
205. A second potential source for due process protection builds from the first. If we
assume there exists a social contract in which the government will administer a cash assistance program in a nonarbitrary manner, the government has created legitimate expectations that if the recipient meets the criteria and abides by the program rules he or she will
be eligible for assistance. See Cimini, supra note 31. This legitimate expectation creates an
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of a government program without standards and in an absolutely discretionary fashion is contrary to established understandings of the appropriate role of government and to our implicit agreement to be
governed.2 °6
Applying inherent principles of individual liberty and limited government to the Welfare Reform Act would constrain government discretion. For example, a welfare program would be required to have
ascertainable written standards to guide the discretion of caseworkers.
Further, these written standards would have to be published, and the
ultimate application of standards to individuals would be subject to
judicial review.20 7 In the absence of such standards and checks, the
entitlement for eligible recipients, which leads to a property interest and subsequent procedural due process protections. For a detailed exploration of this legitimate expectation
analysis, see id.
206. While some scholars might argue that the arbitrariness doctrine itself would protect recipients from such improper government action, the devolution accompanying welfare reform raises questions about this doctrine's applicability. In the context of devolved
authority, increased discretion, and fewer rules, the scope of protection against arbitrary
action is less clear. Typically, when an agency acts in an adjudicatory fashion, the agency
must comport with basic notions of due process, including the prohibition against arbitrary action. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964). The arbitrary and capricious standard under the Federal Administrative Procedures Act requires a court to
overturn any agency decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000); see Fund for Animals v.
Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that "[a]n agency action is arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has failed to follow procedure as required by law, or has entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem" (internal citation omitted)); Varicon Int'l v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 934 F. Supp. 440, 444 (D.D.C. 1996) (determining that
the agency action is not arbitrary or capricious if the agency decision "was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment" (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971))). An agency is said to act in an adjudicatory manner when making determinations
about factual issues and applying legal criteria to the facts. See Hornsby, 326 F.2d at 608
(finding that basic requirements of due process apply to licenses because licensing consists
of the determination of factual issues and the application of legal criteria to them). However, as the administrative functions become less clear through devolution of administrative authority and increased discretion, what constitutes adjudicatory action may, as a
corollary, also become less apparent or definite. See Diller, supra note 22, at 1147. Moreover, the arbitrary and capricious doctrine is a very lenient standard of review. See generally
2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 11.4 (4th ed. 2002). Making
nonarbitrariness an implicit term of the social contract provides welfare recipients with an
additional source of protection. For a discussion of the Federal and State Administrative
Procedure Acts as they apply to federal block grants, see Janet Varon, Passing the Bucks:
Procedural Protections Under Federal Block Grants, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 231, 267-74

(1983).
207. See also Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1135 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
that "where the defendants have already established a category of eligible applicants, such
as the category of 'poor' persons here, the County may not arbitrarily and capriciously
deny the availability of that category by lodging unlimited discretion in the hands of the
decisionmaker"); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that welfare
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government could act in unfair and unequal ways, which would be
impermissible under the terms of the social contract. 2 °8 In this way,
the macro social contract at a minimum prohibits arbitrary government action.
B.

Micro Contracts: IRC and Express Agreements

In addition to constraints mandated by concepts of social contract, due process protection also may arise from a contractual analysis
of the individual responsibility plans (IRPs) or individual responsibility contracts (IRCs). This section is designed to explore the possibility
that the IRPs or IRCs entered into between the government and welfare recipients are legally cognizable contracts and, as such, create a
property interest for procedural due process purposes. This contractual interest may provide a more secure basis for recipients' procedural due process rights because the existence of the property interest
does not depend upon the absence of government discretion, as it
does under a legitimate expectation analysis.
1.

Are the TANF Agreements Legally Cognizable Contracts?-The ap-

plication of fundamental contract law principles to the "agreement"
imposed upon welfare recipients indicates that the written accord between the recipient and government agency may constitute a legally
cognizable contract. Essentially, for a contract to exist, the elements
of offer, acceptance, and consideration (or a consideration substitute)
must exist.

209

An offer is a promise to act in some way in the future or to refrain
from some act in the future."
The offeree accepts the offer by perassistance programs should be administered fairly and in a way to avoid arbitrary decisionmaking); Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding "that
the existence of absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an [administrative] agency ...
would be an intolerable invitation to abuse"); County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Deaconess
Hosp., Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("[P]arties are entitled to fair
notice of the criteria by which their petitions will be judged by an agency .... judicial
review is hindered when agencies operate in the absence of established guidelines.").
208. See supra notes 78-104 and accompanying text (describing the dangers of unchecked government action).
209. Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 2001); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979) (specifying that the proper formation of a contract
requires mutual assent and consideration); see also JOHN MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 28, at 51 (3d ed. 1990) (explaining that two of the essential elements to the
formation of a contract are mutual assent and consideration).
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 cmt. a ("In the normal case of an
offer of an exchange of promises, or in the case of an offer of a promise for an act, the
offer itself is a promise, revocable until accepted."); see also MURRAY, supra note 209, § 29, at
52 ("Almost invariably, an offer is created by a promise . . ").
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formance of an act, forbearance from acting, or the making of a
counter promise in accordance with the original offer.2 11 These first
two requirements of offer and acceptance are often referred to as mutual assent, or the "expression of agreement between or among parties, '21 2 and form the basis of the underlying agreement between the
parties. If this agreement is supported by consideration or a consideration substitute and there are no defenses, the parties have created a
21 3
legally cognizable contract.
Applying this contractual analysis to the TANF agreements,

21 4

it

appears that both parties to the contract-the governmental entity administering TANF and the recipient-promise to perform respective
acts in the future. As evidenced by the IRC or IRP, the applicant
promises to engage in express work activities as well as other obligations in exchange for the government's promise to provide the applicant with monthly support, including money and services. 21 5 Thus
the applicant is both a promisor, whose duty it is to complete the requirements, and a promisee, to whom the government has promised
to provide cash benefits and services. Similarly, the government is a
promisor, whose duty it is to pay the recipient upon completion of the
obligations, and a promisee, to whom the recipient has promised to
complete the work activities or other responsibilities. These promises
operate as the offer and acceptance required for the formation of a
contract. This offer and acceptance is then memorialized in the writ211. MURRAY, supra note 209, § 29, at 52. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines
acceptance of an offer as follows:
(1) Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made
by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.
(2) Acceptance by performance requires that at least part of what the offer requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance by a performance
which operates as a return promise.
(3) Acceptance by a promise requires that the offeree complete every act essential
to the making of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50; see also Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St.

George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995) ("An acceptance is a manifestation of assent to
an offer, such that an objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully
enforceable contract has been made.").
212. MURRay, supra note 209, § 29, at 51 (emphasis omitted).
213. See Koltis v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 480 S.E.2d 702, 704 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
("A valid contract requires offer, acceptance, consideration, and no defenses to formation."); see also MURRAY, supra note 209, § 28, at 51.
214. For purposes of this section, the TANF agreements to which this Article refers are
the IRPs or IRCs that the government and individual recipients enter into. See supra notes
71-77 and accompanying text for a detailed description of the agreements. The question
explored in this section is whether these agreements can be considered contracts.
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. V 1999) (describing the individual responsibility
plans).
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ten agreement that constitutes the expression of the contract between
the parties.
Discussion of the terms of the welfare contract should address
both the duration of the agreement and the explicit obligations for
each party. The duration of the TANF contract would last as long as
the recipient was receiving assistance, but could last no more than
sixty months. 2 6 Likewise, the specific terms of the contract would be
determined by the agreement itself. 21 7 Thus, the contract may obli-

gate the recipient to complete a range of activities, including job-related activities such as job search, job readiness classes, or vocational
activities as well as non-job-related tasks, including obtaining child immunization, assuring a child's attendance at school, or attending
parenting classes. 21 8 The specific terms vary with each contract.
On the other hand, the government's obligation is likely to be
much more consistent across the range of contracts. In virtually all
circumstances, the government's obligation would presumably include the payment of cash assistance. 21 9 In general, the expectation is
that these payments will be made on a monthly basis. 220 However, the
government may also be obligated to provide services to enable recipients to perform their obligations. These services can include child
care arrangements, job training classes, or transportation vouchers.2 2 1
In addition to these explicit terms, once the government creates an
IRP or an IRC, the government will be bound by the statutory provi-

216. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A). The federal statute does permit states to exempt up to
20% of their caseload from the sixty month lifetime limit. Id. § 608(a) (7) (C) (ii). States
can grant an exemption if a hardship exists or if the family includes an individual who has
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty as defined by the statute. Id.
§ 608(a) (7) (C) (i). For a definition of "battered" or subject to "extreme cruelty," see id.
§ 608(a) (7) (C) (iii).
217. See Colorado Works Individual Responsibility Contract, attached as Appendix I
(specifying that the "contract contains terms and conditions governing the participant's
receipt of assistance . .

").

218. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2) (A) (describing the contents of the individual responsibility plans); App. 1, supra note 217 (listing the various activities required by the Colorado
Works program).
219. Every state and the District of Columbia provide some form of cash assistance.
STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION

PROJECT, MAXIMUM

CASH ASSISTANCE

available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/financial/maxben.pdf
[hereinafter MAXIMUM CASH ASSISTANCE BENEFIT AMOUNTS].

BENEFIT AMOUNTS,

(last visited Feb. 4, 2002)

220. Cash assistance is generally administered on a monthly basis. See STATE POLICY Doc-

2001, available at http://
www.spdp.org/tanf/financial/maxben200l.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
UMENTATION PROJECT, MAXIMUM CASH AND FOOD STAMP BENEFITS

221. See 42 U.S.C. § 604 (permitting states to use TANF block grant funds in any manner

reasonably calculated to accomplish the purposes of the act or in any manner that was
permissible under the AFDC program).
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sion that implicitly obligates the government to provide some services
222
to enable recipients to obtain and maintain employment.
If this concluded the analysis, it would seem rather straightforward. However, other provisions of the Welfare Reform Act pose complications. Specifically, the federal statute, and some state statutes,
contain an express "no entitlement" provision,2 23 which could be construed as the government's attempt to visciate its obligations to be le224
gally bound by the terms of the express IRP agreements.
Additionally, some states include language in their statutes explicitly
stating that the written IRP or IRC agreements do not create legally
binding contracts. 225 These state and federal statutory provisions raise
222. Id. § 608(b)(2)(A)(iv).
223. Id. § 601(b). There are seventeen states that have explicit "no entitlement" language in their state statutes. STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, FINDINGS IN BRIEF:
TO
BENEFITS,
available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/entitlement/
cashassistance-entitlementsummlist.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2001). These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT,
CASH ASSISTANCE ENTITLEMENT POLICIES, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/entitlement.PDF (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
224. It might be argued that the "no entitlement" language was designed to create an
agreement with no legal consequences. However, equally apparent is other language conflicting with the express "no entitlement" provisions, which clearly indicates that the government intended these agreements be considered a contract. For example, in some states
the agreement is actually called an "Individual Responsibility Contract" (IRC), expressly
states that it is a "contract" between the participant and the state, and clearly delineates the
rights and responsibilities of the parties to the agreement. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 26-2-708 (West Supp. 2001).
225. Initially, under the employment-at-will doctrine employers argued that they could
fire employees for any reason or no reason at all. See Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc.,
511 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). However, courts found that other factors, such as
the language in employee handbooks, could be considered when determining the right of
the employer to fire without cause. Id. at 841; see also Beck v. Phillips Colleges, Inc., 883
P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (O.K. CL App. 1994) (recognizing that at-will employment in
Oklahoma can be converted to an implied contract if certain factors exist, including employer handbooks and policy manuals, longevity of employment, detrimental reliance on
oral assurances, or pre-employment interviews); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280,
284-85 (N.M. 1989) (holding that a binding agreement may be formed by such things as
employer's oral representations ofjob security and customary personnel practice, as well as
the contents of employee handbooks); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980) (finding that the oral representations could be considered
in conjunction with employee handbooks in order to determine whether there was an
implied contract for job security).
After courts began to find that handbooks or other materials created rights for employees, employers started to expressly state on such materials that the materials themselves did not create any legal rights. See Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 947 (Wyo.
1999) (holding that a disclaimer of contractual obligation in an employment handbook
was sufficient to prevent the employment handbook from having contract status). Despite
the employers' attempts to negate their legal obligations, courts decided that determining
ENTITLEMENT
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questions as to the government's intention to be legally bound by the
226
agreement-a necessary requirement for an enforceable contract.
Although these statutory provisions may represent a clear manifestation of government intent that the agreement be nonbinding,
they conflict with other indicia of government intent. For example,
the agreements specifically set forth the obligatory terms of each party
and, in many instances, are referred to as "contracts" that are signed
by both the applicant and the caseworker as representative of the government. 2 27 Such factors seem to indicate the government's intent to
create a legally binding agreement even in light of the statutory "no
entitlement" provisions.
Despite the conflict between legally binding and nonlegally binding indicia, courts are likely to ultimately determine that the necessary
mutual assent exists. Relying upon rules of construction governing
conflicting provisions in a contract, courts are apt to construe any ambiguity against the drafter, in this case the government. 228 As such,
the government's attempt to create a nonlegally binding agreement
might be obviated by other indicia of a binding agreement. Further,
in light of the legal tendency to look with disfavor upon provisions
designed to negate legal obligations,2 29 as well as the other indicators,
an argument could be made that in fact mutual assent does exist.
Further, even presuming that the "no entitlement" and "nonlegally binding" provisions did operate to negate the government's obligations arising out of the contracts, courts might limit the application
the nature of an employment relationship requires an analysis of all the circumstances. See
Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1983); Mecier v. Branon, 930
F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Vt. 1996) (finding that handbook disclaimers "must be evaluated in
the context of all the other provisions in a handbook and any other circumstances bearing
on the status of an employment agreement").
226. See, e.g., Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628, 633 (R.I.
1998) ("The offer and the acceptance must be sufficient to manifest objectively the parties'
mutual assent to be bound by a contractual relationship.... ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS § 21 (1979) ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally
binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a
promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract."); see also
MURRAY, supra note 209, § 31, at 56 ("It has frequently been asserted that even though all
of the elements of a contract are present, there is no contract unless the parties also intend
their arrangement to be legally binding.").
227. STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS,
available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/applications/applicprc.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2002).
228. See, e.g., Sanford v. H.A.S., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1223 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("It is
a fundamental tenet of contract law that ambiguous terms in a contract are construed
against the drafter.").
229. See MURRAY, supra note 209, § 98, at 508-09 (explaining that courts tend to disfavor
agreements that run contrary to public policy).
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of such provisions based on notions of fairness or unconscionability.

For example, if a recipient performed under the agreement, and the
government, relying upon the no entitlement provision, refused to
perform, enforcement of the clause might violate notions of fairness. 210 Similarly, in light of the parties' disparate bargaining power
and the lack of meaningful choice on the part of the recipient, courts
might determine the provision denying the existence of a contract to
be unconscionable. 23 '
If the TANF agreements meet the offer and acceptance requirements and the "non-legally binding" clauses are not dispositive, the
next issue is whether the TANF agreements are supported by consideration or a consideration substitute. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, consideration requires a bargained-for exchange
of things of value. 232 An exchange is bargained-for if each party per230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21, cmt. b (explaining that nonlegally
binding clauses may raise difficult questions of interpretation, misrepresentation, mistake,
or overreaching). While courts do not always clearly articulate reasons for not enforcing
nonlegally binding provisions, it is clear that the rationale emphasizes reliance by one party
who may not have read or understood the "non-legally binding" clause. Id. When the
other party later raises the clause in defense, the reliance factor overcomes the technical
defense, and the enforcement of the "non-legally binding" clause may also be unconscionable. Id.; see also MuRRAy, supra note 209, § 31 (B), at 57. For an example of a court's
refusal to uphold nonlegally binding provisions of a contract, see Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co.,
165 A. 205, 208 (Conn. 1933) (holding notice of withdrawal of death benefits ineffective
until the end of the day it was posted).
231. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889) (describing an unconscionable
contract as one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make, on the
one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other"); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 208 addresses unconscionable terms as follows:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208; see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture,

350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (finding that where an element of unconscionability
exists at the time the contract is made, the contract may be unenforceable as a matter of
law).

232. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that the requirements of exchange are:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for
that promise.
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.
(4) The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some
other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person.
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forms or promises to perform, or if each party, as a quid pro quo,
receives something in return. 3 3 Once either party incurs a benefit or
234
suffers a detriment, the "value" requirement is met.

In the context of the administration of benefits, the administering agency and the recipient each agree to obtain benefits and suffer
detriments in order to receive either performance or a return promise
from the other party. The recipient obtains the benefit of monthly
assistance and suffers the detriments of losing individual autonomy
over various life decisions and meeting the government's requirement
of work outside the home.2 3 5 The agency suffers the evident detriment of monthly assistance costs and providing services designed to
assist the recipient in workforce re-entry. In return, the government
gets recipients off the welfare rolls and decreases the amount of their
monetary outlay. 2 3 6 Thus, it appears that the requisite consideration
may exist.
On the other hand, the government could argue that no consideration exists because the monthly assistance grant is a "gift" rather
than an obligation, and neither amounts to valid consideration nor
inducement for the promise.2 3 7 However, the facts belie this characterization because the government benefits not only from the recipient's work toward financial independence in the marketplace, but
also from recipient compliance with other obligations, such as cooperation with child support enforcement, children attending school, and
children being immunized. 238 Thus, on balance, it appears that the
requisite consideration exists when, in exchange for its agreement to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71; see also Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clin-

ics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Consideration is defined as bargained for
exchange whereby the promisor ...

receives some benefit or the promisee . . . suffers a

detriment.").
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 71; see also In re Lueders' Estate, 164

F.2d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1947) ("Consideration, in a contract, is the quid pro quo that the
party to whom the promise is made, does or agrees to do in exchange for the contract.").
234. See MuRRAy, supra note 209, § 60, at 227; see also Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 259
(N.Y. 1891) (finding the existence of consideration when an uncle promised his nephew
$5000 on his twenty-first birthday as long as the nephew refrained from drinking, smoking,
gambling, and swearing until age twenty-one).
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
236. See id.
237. See Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, 131 (1845) (determining that no action in contract was created when brother-in-law asked his sister-in-law to move from the house he had
provided her upon her husband's death); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt.
c ("[A] gift is not ordinarily treated as a bargain, and a promise to make a gift is not made
a bargain by the promise of the prospective donee to accept the gift ....This may be true
even though the terms of [the] gift impose a burden on the donee as well as the donor.").
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2) (A) (ii); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65
(1970) (stating that welfare promotes governmental interests).
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provide monthly assistance, the government obtains the recipient's
compliance with government imposed conditions.
Even in the absence of traditional consideration, however, detrimental reliance would likely suffice to create an enforceable agreement between the parties. The Restatement (Second) of Contractsdefines
detrimental reliance as "[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance .
"...239 As an equitable concept, the promise will be binding if enforcement of the promise results in the avoidance of
injustice. 240
Applying these principles to TANF agreements, it appears that
detrimental reliance may exist. In essence, the administering agency
promises to pay the recipient a monthly grant amount conditioned
upon the completion of obligations set out in the recipient's individual contract. 241 That promise of monthly support, conditioned upon
the completion of certain events by the recipient, would be likely to
induce in the recipient the reliance contemplated by the contract doctrine. 24 2 If it does in fact induce such reliance and if the individual
seeking assistance performs the required tasks, this reliance, coupled
with the injustice that might result, creates a sufficient consideration
substitute. 243 Thus, it appears that the requisite elements exist to sup239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTjRACTS § 90(1); see also Choate v. TRW, Inc., 14 F.3d

74, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[A] promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and that does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.").
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1); see also C&K Petroleum Prods., Inc.

v. Equibank, 839 F.2d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that detrimental reliance is
designed to prevent the injustice that results when a promisee is reasonably induced by,
and relies upon, some promise by a promisor that is broken).
241. Under the Welfare Reform Act, states are mandated to sanction recipients who fail
to engage in work activities and who fail to cooperate with child support enforcement. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 607(e), 608(a)(2). Further, the statute permits a state to reduce, by an
amount the state considers appropriate, assistance to a family when an individual fails without good cause to comply with other responsibilities mandated by his or her individual
agreement. See id. § 608(b)(3). These work activities, child support enforcement obligations, and other responsibilities comprise the obligations placed upon recipients under the
IRPs. See id. § 608(b)(2)(ii).
242. See Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A] promise without any
agreed consideration may be enforced if there has been a substantial change of position by
the promisee in reasonable reliance upon the promise.").
243. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) (finding that a
source's reliance on a reporter's promise to keep the source's name confidential was detrimental); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (holding
that reliance on a promise of employment at will was detrimental).
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contract in the absence of specific

2. Assuming There Is a Legally Cognizable Contract, What Are the Due
Process Implications of the Contract?-This section will explore the due
process implications of a legally cognizable contract between the gov-

ernment and the recipient. A legal contract may create a property
interest, which in turn provides recipients with procedural due process protections.2 4 5 Such analysis stems in part from the concept that
parties to a legally cognizable contract have a certain bundle of rights
that flow from the finding of the contract, including the right to compel compliance with the terms of the agreement. 246 Courts that have
analyzed the import of a contract in the due process context support
the conclusion that a contract can be construed as "property."247
The legal recognition of the agreement as property stems from a
long line of precedent, beginning with the 1972 Supreme Court decision Board of Regents v. Roth. In that case, the Court developed the
liberty-property approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires three elements to establish a procedural due process violation:
state action, the existence of a liberty or property interest, and the
24
deprivation of such interest. 1

244. The recognition of a legally cognizable contract raises many questions that are beyond the scope of this Article. Such questions include the potential defenses available to
either party to the TANF agreement as well as issues regarding enforcement should either
party breach the agreement. I save these questions for another article.
245. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that "a property interest may be created by statute as well as contract," and "that a
person may have a protected property interest in public employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment absent 'sufficient cause' for
discharge").
246. Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565, 1576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that "a contract consists of a bundle of rights," including the right to enforce a
contract in the event of breach).
247. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976) (finding that an ordinance or
implied contract may create a property interest); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02
(1972) (determining that a written contract with explicit tenure provisions creates a property interest, as does a contract "implied" from policies and practices); Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (stating that property interests protected by procedural due
process clearly include ownership of real estate, chattels, or money); Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz,
65 F.3d 1339, 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that an explicit contract may create a property
interest); Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 432 (10th Cir. 1984) (explaining that a federal
statute, city charter, or contract may create a property interest); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 990-91 (2000) (finding that contract
rights are often regarded as property for procedural due process purposes).
248. See 408 U.S. at 569 (suggesting that procedural due process protections apply only
when an individual has been deprived of property and liberty).
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Were the issue to arise in the context of TANF benefits, the "deprivation of interest" prong of the procedural due process question is
unlikely to be at issue. The Supreme Court has found that a deprivation merely requires that government action adversely affect the individual's interest.2 49 Given this broad definition, a sanction, in the
form of a reduction or termination of assistance, by the government
or private entity administering welfare would presumably qualify as a
deprivation for due process purposes.
Similarly, state action is likely to be found because the government typically creates the contract directly with the recipient and
sanctions the recipient for any noncompliance.2 50 Though the state
action analysis is more complicated when the government contracts
out its administrative obligations to private entities, the nature of the
administering agency is not dispositive of the question.2 5 '
The state action doctrine provides two exceptions to the general
notion that private actors are not susceptible to the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 252 The first exception is the "public forum
exception," under which constitutional limitations apply if the private
entity is performing a task that has traditionally been exclusively done
by the government. 253 The second exception is the "entanglement
exception," under which constitutional limitations apply if the government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional
conduct.2 54 In the context of TANF contracts and termination of benefits by private actors contracting with the government, recipients
25 5
could successfully argue that both exceptions apply.
249. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972) (explaining that "it is now well
settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment").
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. V 1999); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970) (stating that the termination of welfare benefits "involves state action that adjudicates important rights").
251. The Supreme Court recently decided to hear argument on a case involving the
scope of "state action" in the context of a privately owned correctional facility operating on
behalf of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The specific question to be addressed by the
Court is whether this private entity may be sued in a Bivens action for violating a prisoner's
civil rights. See Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 377-78 (2000), cert. granted, 121
S. Ct. 2588 (2001).
252. See Gilman, supranote 14, at 609-25 (analyzing the state action complications under
a system of privatized welfare).
253. Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974); see CHEMEINSKY, supra note
201, at 395.
254. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948).
255. Under the "public forum exception," while private entities have frequently played
various roles in the administration of public assistance, eligibility and termination decisions traditionally fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the government. See Bezdek,
supra note 81, at 1566 (describing the expanding power of private entities in determining
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Presuming, as this Article has advocated, that a property interest
continues to exist in the receipt of welfare benefits, and that there is a
deprivation of that interest by state action, the question becomes what
the due process clause requires. Generally, the question of what process is due involves the balancing of various interests: the importance
of the private interest against the risk of government error and the
magnitude of the government interest.25 6 A determination of the requisite process is accomplished by a balancing of these factors.
In the context of public assistance under the previous AFDC program, procedural due process required notice and an opportunity to
be heard prior to the deprivation of benefits. 257 The notice and opportunity to be heard necessitated a hearing at which the individual
had the right to control witnesses, present evidence, hire an attorney,
and have a decision made by a neutral fact finder.2 5 8 Under the analysis set forth in this Article, the continued existence of a property interest in welfare benefits would implicate a private interest similar to that
implicated by AFDC and likely would require a level of procedural
protections consistent with those set out in Goldberg.

welfare eligibility). However, as the scope of authority provided to private actors is increased, this exception may no longer prove beneficial to recipients. See Gilman, supra
note 14, at 620-21 (questioning whether courts will place any limits on governmental entities delegating responsibility to avoid accountability). Recipients could argue that the entanglement exception may apply if unconstitutional action undertaken by the private entity
has been authorized by the state or local government. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1003-12 (1982) (finding that a private nursing home that received subsidies from the state
was not a state actor for the purpose of challenging the home's decision to discharge or
transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care). This second exception is even more
difficult because while the government contracted out certain duties to private entities, the
contract did not contemplate that such performance would be undertaken in an unconstitutional manner. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838-843 (1982) (rejecting both
the "public forum" and the "entanglement" exceptions even though the private school at
issue received a large majority of its funds from the government and was regulated by the
state). Despite these limitations, recipients of welfare administered by private entities
could argue that private contractors receive funding from the state, are regulated by the
state, and are carrying out tasks traditionally undertaken exclusively by the state.
256. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (concluding that due process
is not a fixed concept, but instead requires an analysis of the government and private
interests affected).
257. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
258. Id. at 267-68 (concluding that due process requires that "a recipient have timely
and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own
arguments and evidence orally").
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CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to address one of the more contentious
questions raised in the context of the Welfare Reform Act-whether
welfare benefits are still construed as property for purposes of procedural due process protections. As this Article illustrates, the traditional underpinnings of procedural due process analysis, in the
welfare context, have been altered. These changes may require new
and creative approaches both to defining the existence of a property
interest and to the subsequent due process analysis.
In essence, since Goldberg v. Kelly, welfare benefits have been considered property. 2 59 However, the due process analysis employed in
Goldberghas been called into question.26 ° Under Goldbergand its progeny, the welfare statutes themselves created for the recipient a legitimate expectation in continued receipt of the benefits. 261 This
legitimate expectation was the basis for finding a legal entitlement
and was utilized not only in the welfare context, but also in various
other government benefits programs, licenses to engage in a trade or
profession, and various explicit or implicit contracts. 26 2 A current
concern, however, is that this legitimate expectation analysis depends
in large part upon the amount of discretion provided to the government-as the government's discretion increases the likelihood of
finding legitimate expectations decreases. 26 3 Thus, if recipients of
TANF rely exclusively upon legitimate expectation analysis, they may
be deprived of procedural due process protections at the very time
such protections are most needed.
As the actual impact of welfare reform begins to emerge, a picture of governmental nonaccountability presents the potential for arbitrary action by treating needy individuals differently or unfairly. In
the context of the government's distribution of basic subsistence benefits, such a random and subjective system is impermissible. Exacerbating the problem of increased government discretion is the
loosening of checks on government action. What used to be a federal
statutory system that "entitled" recipients to benefits is now a devolved
localized temporary program designed to get people off assistance
259. Id. at 262 n.8.
260. See Cimini, supra note 31.
261. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 ("Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement
for persons qualified to receive them.").
262. See id. at 261-62 (finding that social security and veterans' educational benefits have
a statutorily created property interest); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters,
589 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that veterans have an interest in the
continued receipt of death and disability payments).
263. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
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and into the workforce. While recipients could previously rely upon a
"legitimate expectation" entitlement analysis to protect against improper discretion by government officials, this analysis may no longer
apply. What has resulted is a devolved system with increased discretion and a loss of government accountability.
This Article offers a due process analysis that provides a more
effective means of addressing the "new" structure of welfare benefits.
This analysis, based in the law of contracts, includes both macro and
micro aspects. The macro contractual analysis, based on the concept
of social contract between recipients and the government, identifies
an implicit guarantee that the government will not act arbitrarily
when administering a government benefits program. The micro contract, evidenced by the express agreement between each individual
recipient and the government, provides even greater protections by
creating a property interest that provides the recipient with a basis
upon which to claim significant procedural due process protections.
In light of the fundamental changes in the administration of welfare, recipients need new tools by which to hold the government accountable. Without such tools, those most vulnerable may be left
without any legal checks or balances to assuage the discretion of government actors who wield power over their lives. Scholars and advocates alike must draw upon their skills, insights, and creativity to help
the law respond appropriately in preventing these ongoing and impending injustices.
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